On Ecological Conceptualizations of Perceptual Systems and Action Systems

Withagen, Rob; Michaels, Claire F.

doi:10.1177/0959354305057265

Cited by 27 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…its specificity to the task) without discarding the idea of the instrumentality of movement at the level of perceptual invariants. As Withagen and Michaels (2005) point out, Gibson's (1966) concept of a ''perceptual system" as well as Reed's (1982) concept of an ''action system" assume the functional dependence of action and perception at the level of goal-directed behavior. The same information can be ''captured" by different perceptual systems which may physically vary, and cannot be described with reference to specific anatomical structures (Reed, 1986).…”

Section: Motor-dependence Vs Action-dependencementioning

confidence: 98%

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Action-dependent perceptual invariants: From ecological to sensorimotor approaches

Mossio

Taraborelli

2008

Consciousness and Cognition

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Ecological and sensorimotor theories of perception build on the notion of action-dependent invariants as the basic structures underlying perceptual capacities. In this paper we contrast the assumptions these theories make on the nature of perceptual information modulated by action. By focusing on the question, how movement specifies perceptual information, we show that ecological and sensorimotor theories endorse substantially different views about the role of action in perception. In particular we argue that ecological invariants are characterized with reference to transformations produced in the sensory array by movement: such invariants are transformation-specific but do not imply motor-specificity. In contrast, sensorimotor theories assume that perceptual invariants are intrinsically tied to specific movements. We show that this difference leads to different empirical predictions and we submit that the distinction between motor equivalence and motor-specificity needs further clarification in order to provide a more constrained account of action/perception relations.

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Section: Motor-dependence Vs Action-dependencementioning

confidence: 98%

“…it specifies ''possibilities for action" (Gibson, cit. ;Withagen & Michaels, 2005). Invariants specify information only to animals engaging in actions and in this sense information provided by invariants has been considered as constitutively actiondependent (Gibson, 1979;Reed, 1996;Warren, 2006b).…”

Section: Motor-dependence Vs Action-dependencementioning

confidence: 98%

Action-dependent perceptual invariants: From ecological to sensorimotor approaches

Mossio

Taraborelli

2008

Consciousness and Cognition

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“…Gibson, 1979Gibson, /1986Heft, 2001Heft, , 2007Ingold, 2000;Withagen & Michaels, 2005a;Zukow-Goldring, 1997;Ingold, 2000;Turvey, 2009;Wagman & Miller, 2003). Oyama took it central to her conception of information, and J. J. Gibson adopted it in describing the animal's environment.…”

Section: Implications For the Ecological Approach To Perception And Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards a new ecological conception of perceptual information: Lessons from a developmental systems perspective

Withagen¹,

Kamp²

2010

Human Movement Science

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Over the last two decades or so, empirical studies of perception, action, learning, and development have revealed that participants vary in what variable they detect and use and often rely on nonspecifying variables. This casts doubt on the Gibsonian conception of information as specification. It is argued that a recent ecological conception of information has solved important problems, but falls short in explaining what determines the object of perception. Drawing on recent work on developmental systems, we sketch the outlines of an alternative conception of perceptual information.It is argued that perceptual information does not reside in the ambient arrays; rather, perceptual information is a relational property of patterns in the array and perceptual processes. What a pattern in the ambient flow informs about depends on the perceiver who uses it. Here, we explore the implications of this alternative conception of information for the ecological approach to perception and action. The concept of information is a strongly debated notion in the study of perception and action. Indeed, among the issues that separate contemporary approaches to perception and action is the idea of what information is and where it resides. Proponents of indirect theories of perception have asserted that the information involved in perception exists both in the environment and the perceiver. Roughly speaking, this theory holds that the stimulus information that impinges on the senses is impoverished and needs to be enriched (e.g., Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1981;Neisser, 1967;Ullman, 1980). Thus, information residing in the animal enriches the impoverished stimulus information that the senses receive from the environment. Advocates of the theory of direct perception, by contrast, have claimed that all the information that is needed for perception is "out there" in the environment. J. J. Gibson (1966Gibson ( , 1979Gibson ( /1986, the founder of the ecological theory, asserted that the ambient energy arrays contain information that is rich and sufficient for perception. Because information in the arrays is specific to environmental properties, enrichment processes can be dispensed with. Perception is simply the extraction of specifying information that resides in the ambient array.Since its inception in the 1960s and 1970s, J. J. Gibson's ecological theory of perception and action has inspired many researchers, giving rise to a fruitful experimental program, the results of which are steadily accumulating (e

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“…O autor estabelece assim os princípios da perspectiva ecológica de percepção-ação, na qual os indivíduos são capazes de perceber possibilidades de ação (affordances) oferecidas ou suportadas pelo ambiente 10,11 .…”

Section: Discussionunclassified

“…Informação, nesse contexto, refere-se a um padrão de energia que especifica precisa e fielmente a existência e as características de objetos e eventos do mundo real e informa fielmente sobre o mundo físico sem necessidade de processamento inferencial ou da existência de processos probabilísticos 10 . A perspectiva ecológica, defendida inicialmente por Gibson, traz a idéia de que indivíduos são capazes de captar as informações disponíveis no ambiente e agir (percepção-ação) 10,11 . Dessa forma, o objetivo deste ensaio foi descrever o desenvolvimento e a coordenação do alcance humano em uma perspectiva teórica fundamentada na abordagem ecológica à percepção e ação, para aprofundar a compreensão do movimento humano.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

O movimento funcional de alcance em uma abordagem ecológica

2010

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Teorias de controle motor tradicionais assumiam um modelo de representação interna responsável pela organização e regulação do alcance, tendo por controlador o sistema nervoso central (SNC). Perspectivas contemporâneas questionam a habilidade de somente o SNC controlar e regular os movimentos. Ações podem não ser guiadas apenas pelo SNC, mas também por informações presentes no ambiente, estando o controle no sistema indivíduo-ambiente. A detecção da informação é um processo ativo: o indivíduo explora o ambiente, percebe possibilidades de ação fornecidas por ele e age em reposta ao que é oferecido. O objetivo deste estudo foi descrever o desenvolvimento e a coordenação do alcance em uma perspectiva teórica fundamentada na abordagem ecológica à percepção-ação, para promover melhor compreensão do movimento humano. Discutem-se nesta revisão de literatura o desenvolvimento do alcance desde a infância até a idade adulta, formas de operacionalização, fatores extrínsecos e intrínsecos relacionados, relações invariantes entre indivíduo e objeto a ser alcançado. Esse referencial teórico pode permitir a compreensão de como intervenções alteram a estabilidade vigente no sistema, levando à emergência de novas soluções funcionais. Em uma visão ecológica, o alcance é entendido de forma ampla: para explicar a ocorrência do movimento, devem considerar-se as informações do ambiente, além das características intrínsecas do indivíduo.

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On Ecological Conceptualizations of Perceptual Systems and Action Systems

Cited by 27 publications

References 35 publications

Action-dependent perceptual invariants: From ecological to sensorimotor approaches

Action-dependent perceptual invariants: From ecological to sensorimotor approaches

Towards a new ecological conception of perceptual information: Lessons from a developmental systems perspective

O movimento funcional de alcance em uma abordagem ecológica

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