On Husserl’s Remark that “[s]elbst eine sich als apodiktisch ausgebende Evidenz kann sich als Täuschung enthüllen …” (XVII 164:32–33): Does the Phenomenological Method Yield Any Epistemic Infallibility?

Heffernan, George

doi:10.1007/s10743-008-9051-5

Cited by 30 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…For an extensive and highly valuable discussion of this passage cf. Heffernan (2009). Enlightening remarks concerning the fallibility of a priori insights can be found in BonJour (1998, § §4.4, 4.5).…”

Section: Intuition As a Source Of Immediate Yet Fallible Justificationmentioning

confidence: 95%

Why Husserl is a Moderate Foundationalist

Berghofer

2017

Husserl Stud

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Foundationalism and coherentism are two fundamentally opposed basic epistemological views about the structure of justification. Interestingly enough, there is no consensus on how to interpret Husserl. While interpreting Husserl as a foundationalist was the standard view in early Husserl scholarship, things have changed considerably as prominent commentators like Christian Beyer, John Drummond, Dagfinn Føllesdal, and Dan Zahavi have challenged this foundationalist interpretation. These anti-foundationalist interpretations have again been challenged, for instance, by Walter Hopp and Christian Erhard. One might suspect that inconsistencies in Husserl's writings are the simple reason for this disagreement. I shall argue, however, that the real question is not so much how to read Husserl, but how to define foundationalism and that there is overwhelming textual evidence that Husserl championed the most tenable version of foundationalism: a moderate foundationalism that allows for incorporating coherentist elements.

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Section: Intuition As a Source Of Immediate Yet Fallible Justificationmentioning

confidence: 95%

Why Husserl is a Moderate Foundationalist

Berghofer

2017

Husserl Stud

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“…By 'moderate rationalism' is understood a theory that performs its analyses by adopting the thesis that evidence can be achieved at many levels and grades. Here perfect evidence can also appear as imperfect (Heff ernan, 2009). Yet this imperfect evidence (as an equivalent to unreason) can be a subject of evidential inquiry (as an equivalent to reason).…”

Section: Moderate Rationalism and Imperfect Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Husserl’s Moderate Rationalism and the Question of Evidence

Płotka¹

2019

HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOM

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Th is article is an attempt to present Husserl's phenomenology as a moderate form of rationalism. By 'moderate rationalism' is understood, fi rst, a theory that does not exclude the problem of irrationality, and that comprehends the rational as a correlate of the irrational. Second, it is a theory that performs its analyses by adopting the thesis that evidence can be achieved at many levels and grades. Here perfect evidence can also appear as imperfect. Yet this imperfect evidence (as an equivalent to unreason) can be a subject of evidential inquiry (as an equivalent to reason). Th e argument is that moderate rationalism is connected with the transcendental character of phenomenology and leads to the perennial reconsideration of the question of evidence (Evidenz). A basic claim is that irrationality is to be understood in terms of possible vague levels and grades of evidence. By developing 'moderate rationalism' thus understood, one is interested in understanding reason, that is, in the question of the essence of reason in its correlation with unreason. Here, moderate rationalism is directly interested not in rational arguments, but in 'elucidation' of reason. It is argued that phenomenology of reason also investigates 'irrational evidence,' for example, background evidence, evidence with respect to others, as well as all forms of fallible evidence. Th erefore, the main question of moderate rationalism is Husserl's question of evidence.

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“…132f.). The passage in which Husserl declares that “[t] he possibility of deception is inherent in the evidence of experience” and that “[e] ven an ostensibly apodictic evidence can be become disclosed as deception” is discussed in detail in Heffernan (). However, it should be noted that this is not the only passage in which Husserl declares apodictic evidence to be fallible.…”

Section: Husserl On the Nature Of Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hopp, ; Rinofner‐Kreidl, ) and Hopp and Heffernan (cf. Heffernan, ; Hopp, ). Recently, I have argued that current debates in analytic epistemology could benefit from a phenomenological input in Berghofer (, , ).…”

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confidence: 99%

On the nature and systematic role of evidence: Husserl as a proponent of mentalist evidentialism?

Berghofer

2018

European J of Philosophy

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In this paper, I shall show that for Husserl, (a) evidence determines epistemic justification and (b) evidence is linked to originary givenness in the sense that one's ultimate evidence consists of one's originary presentive intuitions. This means that in contemporary analytic terminology, Husserl is a proponent of evidentialism and mentalism. Evidentialism and mentalism have been introduced into current debates by Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. Finally, I shall highlight that there is one significant difference between Husserl and Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. Although Conee and Feldman argue that the fundamental principles of epistemology are principles of best explanation, Husserl opts for phenomenological principles as the most fundamental epistemic principles. The main difference is that for Husserl, experiences gain their justificatory force by virtue of their phenomenal character, namely, their originary givenness.

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On Husserl’s Remark that “[s]elbst eine sich als apodiktisch ausgebende Evidenz kann sich als Täuschung enthüllen …” (XVII 164:32–33): Does the Phenomenological Method Yield Any Epistemic Infallibility?

Abstract: Addressing Walter Hopp's original application of the distinction between agent-fallibility and method-fallibility to phenomenological inquiry concerning epistemic justification,

Cited by 30 publications

References 10 publications

Why Husserl is a Moderate Foundationalist

Why Husserl is a Moderate Foundationalist

Husserl’s Moderate Rationalism and the Question of Evidence

On the nature and systematic role of evidence: Husserl as a proponent of mentalist evidentialism?

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