On-Line Estimation of Base Station Location

Domuta, Ioan; Palade, Tudor

doi:10.1109/lwc.2019.2953848

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…To extrapolate the components that follow (1) from the measured RSS, we propose the use of a Kalman filter. Kalman filters have been widely used in literature to improve the reliability of RSS-based localization [65]. The filter's parameters are usually in the form of matrices resulting in a computational complexity higher than O(N 2 ) [66].…”

Section: A Mobility-enhanced Proximity Estimationmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Physical Layer, Zero-Round-Trip-Time, Multifactor Authentication Protocol

Mitev¹,

Shekiba-Herfeh²,

Chorti³

et al. 2022

IEEE Access

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Lightweight physical layer security schemes that have recently attracted a lot of attention include physical unclonable functions (PUFs), RF fingerprinting / proximity based authentication and secret key generation (SKG) from wireless fading coefficients. In this paper, we propose a fast, privacy-preserving, zero-round-trip-time (0-RTT), multi-factor authentication protocol, that for the first time brings all these elements together, i.e., PUFs, proximity estimation and SKG. We use Kalman filters to extract proximity estimates from real measurements of received signal strength (RSS) in an indoor environment to provide soft fingerprints for node authentication. By leveraging node mobility, a multitude of such fingerprints are extracted to provide resistance to impersonation type of attacks e.g., a false base station. Upon removal of the proximity fingerprints, the residual measurements are then used as an entropy source for the distillation of symmetric keys and subsequently used as resumption secrets in a 0-RTT fast authentication protocol. Both schemes are incorporated in a challenge-response PUF-based mutual authentication protocol, shown to be secure through formal proofs using Burrows, Abadi, and Needham (BAN) and Mao and Boyd (MB) logic, as well as the Tamarin-prover. Our protocol showcases that in future networks purely physical layer security solutions are tangible and can provide an alternative to public key infrastructure in specific scenarios.

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Section: A Mobility-enhanced Proximity Estimationmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Physical Layer, Zero-Round-Trip-Time, Multifactor Authentication Protocol

Mitev¹,

Shekiba-Herfeh²,

Chorti³

et al. 2022

IEEE Access

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“…Instead of relying on a single RSSI measurement, we propose taking multiple RSSI measurements that, thanks to they mobility of the authenticating entity, are unpredictable by an attacker. To the best of our knowledge, this approach has only been reported once in the literature so far in the recent paper [23], where the authors leverage the mobility of a mobile handset to localize a base station using unscented Kalman filters with the time of arrival (ToA) and angle of arrival (AoA) information as inputs. Our proposed proximity estimator is much simpler and faster as it relies solely on RSSI measurements and uses a simple Kalman filter with scalar inputs, so it is an attractive approach for inverse proximity estimation in IoT networks.…”

Section: Related Work and Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi-factor Physical Layer Security Authentication in Short Blocklength Communication

Mitev,

Shekiba-Herfeh,

Chorti

et al. 2020

Preprint

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Lightweight and low latency security mechanisms are becoming increasingly important for a wide range of Internet of things (IoT) applications. Promising schemes from the physical layer include (i) physical unclonable functions (PUFs), (ii) localization based authentication, and, (iii) secret key generation (SKG) from wireless fading coefficients. In this paper, we focus on short blocklengths and propose a complete, fast, multi-factor authentication protocol that uniquely combines PUFs, proximity estimation and SKG. To demonstrate the performance of the SKG scheme in the short blocklength (with a focus on delay constrained applications), we provide a numerical comparison of three families of channel codes, including low density parity check codes (LDPC), Bose Chaudhuri Hocquenghem (BCH), and, Polar codes. The SKG keys are incorporated in a zeroround-trip-time resumption protocol for fast re-authentication. All schemes of the proposed mutual authentication protocol are shown to be secure through formal proofs using Burrows, Abadi and Needham (BAN) and Mao and Boyd (MB) logic as well as the Tamarin-prover.

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On-Line Estimation of Base Station Location

Cited by 2 publications

References 23 publications

A Physical Layer, Zero-Round-Trip-Time, Multifactor Authentication Protocol

A Physical Layer, Zero-Round-Trip-Time, Multifactor Authentication Protocol

Multi-factor Physical Layer Security Authentication in Short Blocklength Communication

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