On Replication and Perturbation of the McKelvey and Palfrey Centipede Game Experiment

Cox, James C.; James, Duncan

doi:10.1108/s0193-230620150000018003

Cited by 6 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…The four‐move centipede game is identical to the one in Figure , with the only difference that ends at node 4 where players may end with payoffs of 6.40 and 1.60, respectively, if they both play “Pass” at all nodes. We use the data from the McKelvey and Palfrey () four‐move game, as well as data from Treatment 1 in Cox and James () who replicate McKelvey and Palfrey (). The results are reported in Table and confirm the conclusions of the analysis above.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Comparing Behavioral Models Using Data From Experimental Centipede Games

Georgalos

2019

Economic Inquiry

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The centipede game posits one of the most well‐known paradoxes of backward induction in the literature of experimental game theory. Given that deviations from the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium generates a Pareto improvement, several theoretical models have been employed in order to rationalize this kind of behavior in this social dilemma. The available explanations range from social preferences including fairness, altruism or cooperation motives, errors in playing, inability to perform backward induction or different depths of reasoning. In the present study, we use the Blavatskyy's theoretical contribution, and relax the assumptions of Expected Utility maximization and risk‐neutral attitudes, to test an alternative explanation. We compare various probabilistic decision theory models in terms of their descriptive (in‐sample) and predictive (out‐of‐sample fit) performance, using data from experimental centipede games. We find that introducing non‐Expected Utility preferences to the Quantal Response Equilibrium model, along with a nonlinear utility function, provides a better explanation compared to alternative specifications such as the Level‐k or the Quantal Response Equilibrium model with altruistic motives. (JEL C72, C92, D81, D82)

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… Note : The abbreviations correspond to the data from the original study: MP92‐4 McKelvey and Palfrey () and CJ Cox and James ().…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Comparing Behavioral Models Using Data From Experimental Centipede Games

Georgalos

2019

Economic Inquiry

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“…It is difficult to pinpoint the precise reason for this, because Cox and James (2012) used a complex experimental design incorporating several unusual features at once, including incomplete payoff information, a Take-it-or-leave-it payoff function, zero payoffs for all if no player defected, and clock timing. Furthermore, follow-up research by the same authors (Cox & James, 2015) investigating four-move Centipede games produced contradictory results. In contrast to their earlier study, game versions with time pressure and clock format did not yield lower cooperation levels than the control condition.…”

Section: Incomplete Information the Vast Majority Of Experimental Cementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Another class of payoff functions that induces highly competitive behaviour includes those in which a player who defects invariably receives the entire accumulated payoff, leaving nothing for the co-player. Only five experimental studies have investigated such Take-it-or-leave-it Centipede games (Cox & James, 2012;Cox & James, 2015;Huck & Jehiel, 2004;Krockow, Pulford, & Colman, 2015;Mcintosh, Shogren, & Moravec, 2009). Cox and James reported one of the lowest levels of cooperation ever found.…”

Section: Summary Measuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Cooperation in repeated interactions: A systematic review of Centipede game experiments, 1992–2016

Krockow

Colman

Pulford

2016

European Review of Social Psychology

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Cooperation is a fundamental form of social interaction, and turn-taking reciprocity one of its most familiar manifestations. The Centipede game provides a formal model of such alternating reciprocal cooperation, but a backward induction argument appears to prove logically that instrumentally rational players would never cooperate in this way. A systematic review of experimental research reveals that human decision makers cooperate frequently in this game, except under certain extreme conditions. Several task, situational, and individual difference variables have been investigated for their influence on cooperation. The most influential are aspects of the payoff function (especially the social gain from cooperation and the risk associated with a cooperative move), the number of players, repetitions of the game, group versus individual decisions, and players' social value orientations. Our review of experimental evidence suggests that other-regarding preferences, including prosocial behavioural dispositions and collective rationality, provide the most powerful explanation for cooperation.Keywords: backward induction, Centipede game, cooperation, game theory, reciprocity Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/00.0000/x0000000.supp COOPERATION IN REPEATED INTERACTIONS 3 Cooperation in Repeated Interactions: A Systematic Review of Centipede Game Experiments, 1992-2016Cooperation is one of the most fundamental forms of human social interaction, and it plays a significant part in many areas of interpersonal, economic, and political life. In his last address as President of the Royal Society, Lord Robert May (2006) expressed the view that "the most important unanswered question in evolutionary biology, and more generally in the social sciences, is how cooperative behaviour evolved and can be maintained in human or other animal groups and societies" (p. 109). Cooperation frequently displays a pattern of repeated interactions in which Person A rewards Person B in some way, then B reciprocates by rewarding A, then A reciprocates by rewarding B again, and so on through several or many cycles of reciprocal cooperation. It is often reasonable to assume that each rewarding action incurs some cost c to the person performing it, financially, materially, or in terms of time, effort, or inconvenience, but that this cost is no larger than the benefit b to the recipient, so that c ≤ b. Typical everyday examples include next-door neighbours taking turns looking after each other's children to enable the parents to enjoy a night out, business associates taking turns providing each other with letters of recommendation for job applications, and academics taking turns providing feedback on each other's research grant applications.The Centipede game, introduced by Rosenthal (1981), provides a game-theoretic model of this class of repeated interactions. Formally, the Centipede game is a finite, extensive-form game (because players make their moves sequentially) with complete information (because they are fully informed abo...

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Book review

Ortmann

2017

Journal of Economic Psychology

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On Replication and Perturbation of the McKelvey and Palfrey Centipede Game Experiment

Cited by 6 publications

References 12 publications

Comparing Behavioral Models Using Data From Experimental Centipede Games

Comparing Behavioral Models Using Data From Experimental Centipede Games

Cooperation in repeated interactions: A systematic review of Centipede game experiments, 1992–2016

Book review

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