On the Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts

Alter, Torin

doi:10.1007/s11098-005-1485-4

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…We want to suggest that an adequate response to this argument has been provided by David Chalmers (Chalmers 2010; see also Alter 2007). Chalmers takes dualism (here understood as conscious-but-merely-physical incompatibilism) to be an a priori truthbut if the oracle told him that everything is physical, he would abandon his a priori conviction that dualism is true.…”

Section: The Flip-flopping Dualistmentioning

confidence: 99%

Resisting the epistemic argument for compatibilism

Todd

Rabern

2023

Philos Stud

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Philosophers are keenly aware that there are at least several (much-discussed) arguments that free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism. But whereas the standard arguments for incompatibilism are well-known, arguments of the opposite sort -positive arguments for compatibilism -are correspondingly harder to come by. In general, it seems that the main way that philosophers defend compatibilism is simply by trying to show that the arguments for incompatibilism fail. And perhaps this makes sense. After all, one might think that there is, in general, some sort of presumption of compatibility; if someone asks for a reason to think that the fact that there is water on Earth is compatible with the fact that there is also water on Mars, the natural reaction is presumably to say: well, why shouldn't these things be compatible?Similarly, to pick two philosophical positions at random, if one were asked for some sort of argument that consequentialism in ethics is compatible with reliabilism in epistemology, presumably one would find it difficult to know what to say. Proving that two things are compatible sometimes can be nothing more than rebutting any argument that they aren't.otherwise compatibilism (what we shall here mean by "free will"), the key responses we develop can, we believe, be applied to epistemic arguments of other sorts.Call the following two premises "the data" underlying the argument:(1) We know we are free.(2) For all we know everything is predetermined.Of course, the data stands in need of interpretation -for instance, to whom does "we" refer? As a first approximation, however, the epistemic argument in question somehow moves from the data to a compatibilist conclusion. Now, there will be, of course, responses to this style of argument that outright deny what its proponents consider "the data". For instance, skeptics about freedom will simply deny (1). And certain libertarians will outright deny (2). In this paper, however, we set aside simplistic data-denying responses. Instead, we aim to show that compatibilism doesn't follow from a natural interpretation of the data in question.We proceed as follows. We begin by articulating Lewis' epistemic argument, highlighting its crucial features, and avoiding certain key interpretive pitfalls, while setting aside what we take to be weak responses to the argument. We then turn to our preferred assessment of the argument. In doing so, we will draw out a connection between the epistemic argument and parallel issues that have arisen in the physicalism/dualism debates. If a dualist concedes (as it seems they should) that for all they know an oracle might tell them that the world is merely physical, then, since they know they are conscious, this concession would seem to force them into abandoning their commitment to dualism. But we will show that, properly understood, this concession is no threat to the dualist. And, in a parallel fashion, we will argue that an incompatibilist needn't be threatened by the concession underwriting (2), viz., tha...

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Section: The Flip-flopping Dualistmentioning

confidence: 99%

Resisting the epistemic argument for compatibilism

Todd

Rabern

2023

Philos Stud

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“…Second, whereas advocates of the conditional analysis present their core claim as an a priori truth, in proposing the disjunctive view, we do not mean to do so. This last point is an especially important difference because a critic of the conditional analysis can question the a priori status of such conditionals (see Alter 2007). Regardless of whether such criticism is successful, the disjunctive view is not vulnerable to it.…”

Section: The Disjunctive View Of Phenomenal Consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Physicalism or Anti-physicalism: A Disjunctive Account

Baysan

Wildman

2022

Erkenn

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In this paper, we make a case for the disjunctive view of phenomenal consciousness: consciousness is essentially disjunctive in being either physical or non-physical in the sense that it has both physical and non-physical possible instances. We motivate this view by showing that it undermines two well-known conceivability arguments in philosophy of mind: the zombie argument for anti-physicalism, and the anti-zombie argument for physicalism. By appealing to the disjunctive view, we argue that two hitherto unquestioned premises of these arguments are false. Furthermore, making use of the resources of this view, we formulate distinct forms of both physicalism and anti-physicalism. On these formulations, it is easy to see how physicalists and anti-physicalists can accommodate the modal intuitions of their opponents regarding zombies and anti-zombies. We conclude that these formulations of physicalism and anti-physicalism are superior to their more traditional counterparts.

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“…The first objection, which is raised by Chalmers (2005) and Alter (2007), states that the analysis doesn't explain the correct zombie intuition and, moreover, that it can't because the analysis is inconsistent with this intuition.…”

Section: The Wrong Intuitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It will be explained how there are two distinct ways the analysis can be used to undermine the conceivability argument. (2) To employ this exposition to defend the analysis from objections leveled against it by Chalmers (2005) and Alter (2007). …”

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confidence: 99%

A Priori Conditionals and the Conceivability of Zombies

Majeed

2014

Philosophical Papers

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Abstract:The conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts, as proposed independently by Hawthorne (2002), Stalnaker (2002 and Braddon-Mitchell (2003), is used to undermine Chalmers's (1996) conceivability argument in a way that is compatible with our having the zombie intuition. The aim of this paper is twofold: (1) To remove current misconceptions concerning how the analysis is to be applied. It will be explained how there are two distinct ways the analysis can be used to undermine the conceivability argument. (2) To employ this exposition to defend the analysis from objections leveled against it by Chalmers (2005) and Alter (2007).

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On the Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts

Cited by 7 publications

References 19 publications

Resisting the epistemic argument for compatibilism

Resisting the epistemic argument for compatibilism

Physicalism or Anti-physicalism: A Disjunctive Account

A Priori Conditionals and the Conceivability of Zombies

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