On the Danger and Necessity of Democratisation: trade-offs between short-term stability and long-term peace in post-genocide Rwanda

Silva-Leander, Sebastian

doi:10.1080/01436590802528754

Cited by 19 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 11 publications

(11 reference statements)

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“…Parliamentary elections in 2008 and presidential elections in 2010 were characterized by irregularities, intimidation of the opposition and a lack of competition and were dominated by the ruling party (EU‐EOM Rwanda, ; Commonwealth Secretariat, ). Opposition parties, independent newspapers and civil society organizations accused of divisionism have been shut down on the basis of the legislation against genocide (Sidiropoulos, , p. 81; Silva‐Leander, , pp. 1613–14).…”

Section: Instrumental Variation In Eu Democracy Promotion In Guinea mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Given its impressive reduction of corruption, Rwanda is seen as the ‘Singapore of Africa’ (Zorbas, , p. 108). Kagame's policies of national unity, based on the suppression of ethnic identities, have brought relative peace among the Hutu and Tutsi after the violent genocide of 1994 (Silva‐Leander, ). Finally, there has hardly been any pressure from regional organizations on democratization in Rwanda.…”

Section: Explaining Instrumental Variation: Realism or Idealism?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Norms or Interests? Explaining Instrumental Variation in EU Democracy Promotion in Africa

Biondo

2014

J of Common Market Studies

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This article investigates the causes for instrumental variation in EU democracy promotion in Africa. Can instrumental variation better be explained from a realist or from an idealist perspective? Realism would predict that sanctions are more likely in the absence of historical, security or commercial interests. Idealism would suggest that sanctions are more likely in the case of grave violations of democracy and human rights, in countries that are unstable and economically underperforming, and when there is pressure from regional organizations and domestic actors. Empirically, the article compares two cases (Guinea and Niger) where the EU imposed sanctions and two non-cases (Ethiopia and Rwanda) where the EU was reluctant to do so. Contrary to the prevalent thesis in the literature, the article finds stronger evidence for idealism (which is confirmed in all the cases) than for realism (which is only confirmed in the cases of Guinea and Ethiopia).

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Section: Instrumental Variation In Eu Democracy Promotion In Guinea mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Explaining Instrumental Variation: Realism or Idealism?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Norms or Interests? Explaining Instrumental Variation in EU Democracy Promotion in Africa

Biondo

2014

J of Common Market Studies

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“…International scholars commonly describe the Rwandan government as adopting the language of international development and donor‐favoured discourses in order to remain attractive to donors (Silva‐Leander, ; Hayman, , ; Zorbas, ). The eloquent articulation of participatory ideals irrefutably reflects the international participation discourse.…”

Section: Participation In the Developmental State And In Rwandan “Hommentioning

confidence: 99%

Rwandan “home grown initiatives”: Illustrating inherent contradictions of the democratic developmental state

Hasselskog

2018

Development Policy Review

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“…As such, the Party for Democracy and Regeneration was banned in 2001 and its leader, former President Bizimungu, was arrested and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment (Reyntjens 2006(Reyntjens : 1104(Reyntjens -1107Beswick 2010a: 235). In the context of the 2003 elections, the opposition party with the largest support base, the Hutu-based Democratic Republican Movement, was declared illegal (Longman 2011: 33;Silva-Leander 2008: 1613. In 2009, a controversial press law was signed that allowed the government to regulate journalists and review the content of publications (Longman 2011: 36).…”

Section: Eu Democracy Promotionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Norms, self-interest and effectiveness: explaining double standards in EU reactions to violations of democratic principles in Sub-Saharan Africa

Biondo

2012

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The promotion of democracy has become a key objective of the European Union (EU) in sub-Saharan Africa.One of the ways in which this objective is pursued is by reacting to violations of democratic principles using negative measures: naming and shaming strategies or economic/diplomatic sanctions. Yet the application of negative measures has been criticised as being characterised by "double standards", meaning that similar violations of democratic principles have led to a different response from the EU. This dissertation searches for explanations for these double standards. In-depth comparative studies on the motivations for double standards in the application of negative measures in sub-Saharan Africa in the post-2000 period have been lacking. While double standards have mostly been attributed to the prevalence of self-interested objectives of the EU, this dissertation considers two additional factors: (1) a potential conflict in the EU"s normative objectives (democracy, development and stability) and (2) expectations about the effectiveness of negative measures.These three explanatory factors (norms, self-interest and effectiveness) are investigated for ten case studies in sub-Saharan Africa: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Guinea, Côte d"Ivoire and Zimbabwe. It is shown that there have been double standards in the EU"s reaction to violations of democratic principles in these countries: similar violations of democratic principles have led to different reactions from the EU (positive measures, low-cost negative measures and sanctions). The motivations for these double standards are then investigated by studying the potential impact of norms, self-interest and effectiveness.On the one hand, previous studies emphasising self-interest are confirmed. Historical interests related to the desire of member states to maintain their sphere of influence have in some cases led to double standards (Chad, Côte d"Ivoire, Zimbabwe). Moreover, the growing concern for self-interested security objectives such as the war on terror has led to increased tolerance for governments that are seen as crucial allies in fighting these security concerns (Ethiopia, Nigeria, Chad), while sanctions were more easily adopted where this was not the case (Zimbabwe, Guinea, Côte d"Ivoire). On the other hand, the study also found evidence that runs counter to the importance of self-interest: (1) commercial interests were found to have little explanatory value, (2) some countries that can also be considered allies in the security sphere were not shielded from negative measures (Kenya), and (3) the EU also avoided negatives measures in countries that were not allies in the pursuit of security objectives (Eritrea, Rwanda). Furthermore, the EU"s other normative objectives (stability, development) were found to be equally important. Negative measures were more easily adopted in countries where development performance had been weak (Zimbabwe, Guinea, Côte d"Ivoire, Niger) or where internal stability was under threat (Kenya, C...

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On the Danger and Necessity of Democratisation: trade-offs between short-term stability and long-term peace in post-genocide Rwanda

Cited by 19 publications

References 11 publications

Norms or Interests? Explaining Instrumental Variation in EU Democracy Promotion in Africa

Norms or Interests? Explaining Instrumental Variation in EU Democracy Promotion in Africa

Rwandan “home grown initiatives”: Illustrating inherent contradictions of the democratic developmental state

Norms, self-interest and effectiveness: explaining double standards in EU reactions to violations of democratic principles in Sub-Saharan Africa

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