2019
DOI: 10.1080/03085147.2019.1576432
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On the difficulties of addressing collective concerns through markets: from market devices to accountability devices

Abstract: In recent years market-based interventions have been positioned as the basis for addressing what the editors of this special issue have termed 'collective concerns' in fields as diverse as healthcare, the environment and crime. This paper considers the terms of such interventions and the market-like relations these terms pre-suppose. It does so through a comparison of two interventions: a market-based scheme to address concerns regarding electronic waste and a Social Impact Bond for children at-risk of going i… Show more

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Cited by 18 publications
(13 citation statements)
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References 27 publications
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“…This paradox has elsewhere been described as follows: 'if both actors expect success, the commissioner ought not to use a SIB, and if either commissioner or investor expects failure they should not get involved' (Giacomantonio 2017, p. 52). A SIB project would only make sense if the envisaged success rate of the intervention is relatively unclear to both parties, and if the commissioner is particularly risk averse or drawn to the idea of addressing collective concerns through non-governmental action (Neyland et al 2019).…”
Section: De-risking Governmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This paradox has elsewhere been described as follows: 'if both actors expect success, the commissioner ought not to use a SIB, and if either commissioner or investor expects failure they should not get involved' (Giacomantonio 2017, p. 52). A SIB project would only make sense if the envisaged success rate of the intervention is relatively unclear to both parties, and if the commissioner is particularly risk averse or drawn to the idea of addressing collective concerns through non-governmental action (Neyland et al 2019).…”
Section: De-risking Governmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the context of Market Practices, there are two other elements: Market Devices, which are objects that interfere in the construction of markets by making actors perform certain actions (Muniesa et al, 2007;Neyland, Ehrenstein, & Milyaeva, 2019); and Structuring Practices, which do not fit the categorization of Kjellberg and Helgesson (2007) but are relevant in maintaining the market structure now performed .…”
Section: Constructivist Market Studies (Cms)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Dix (2014Dix ( , 2016 shows how economic models were brought into an experiment carried out in the Netherlands to introduce performance-related pay for teachers. Neyland, Ehrenstein and Milyaeva (2019) studied a range of devices used to introduce selective features of markets into the treatment of electronic waste and social investment bonds for the protection of children at risk.…”
Section: Performing the Marketization Of The Nhsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Whilst we support Frankel, Ossandón and Pallesen's (2019) call to study markets for collective concerns, we do not regard market features as a policy instrument in their own right. We suggest that policy instruments carry selected and adapted elements of markets to novel domains to ‘… programme the doing of a particular reality’ (Voß, 2016, p. 7), as illustrated by Dix (2014, 2016), Krafve (2014) and Neyland, Ehrenstein and Milyaeva (2019). Krafve (2014) shows how instruments – involving rules, financial reimbursement schemes and incentives – helped introduce a quasi‐market in the Swedish healthcare sector.…”
Section: Performing the Marketization Of The Nhsmentioning
confidence: 99%