On the Effectiveness of the Remanence Decay Side-Channel to Clone Memory-Based PUFs

Hardware Attack Mitigation Techniques Analysis

“…This will help in the case of an attacker defeating a mitigation technique. For example, a defender that employs a PUF to defend against an attack, and an attacker that uses the technique in [72] to bypass the PUF. If the defender becomes aware of this, they can implement an additional mitigation technique such as clock frequency sensor or a technique that denies partial access so this attack will not succeed.…”

Protecting integrated circuits from piracy with test-aware logic locking

“…They note that EPIC does not provision for direct entry of CK to unlock the circuit. Instead, the encrypted version of CK arriving from the owner of IP rights is protected by the RSA cryptosystem, which offers strong guarantees both in theory and in practice, though implementation-specific vulnerabilities exist [15]. The work in [16] assumes that the circuit has been reverse-engineered and develops attacks that simplify the search for CK, using unfortunate configurations of locking gates that may be created when inserting gates at random.…”

On the Physical Security of Physically Unclonable Functions

“…Moreover, it has been shown that SRAM PUFs can be read out by laser stimulation [64]. Besides, SRAM PUFs are also vulnerable to remanence decay in volatile memories [65]. Finally, the vulnerabilities of the SRAM PUFs in general as a replacement for non-volatile memory are reviewed in [35].…”