Today, embedded, mobile, and cyberphysical systems are ubiquitous and used in many applications, from industrial control systems, modern vehicles, to critical infrastructure. Current trends and initiatives, such as Industrie 4.0 and Internet of Things (IoT), promise innovative business models and novel user experiences through strong connectivity and effective use of next generation of embedded devices. These systems generate, process, and exchange vast amounts of security-critical and privacy-sensitive data, which makes them attractive targets of attacks. Cyberattacks on IoT systems are very critical since they may cause physical damage and even threaten human lives. The complexity of these systems and the potential impact of cyberattacks bring upon new threats. This paper gives an introduction to Industrial IoT systems, the related security and privacy challenges, and an outlook on possible solutions towards a holistic security framework for Industrial IoT systems

Abstract. RFID-based tokens are increasingly used in electronic payment and ticketing systems for mutual authentication of tickets and terminals. These systems typically use cost-effective tokens without expensive hardware protection mechanisms and are exposed to hardware attacks that copy and maliciously modify tokens. Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are a promising technology to protect against such attacks by binding security critical data to the physical characteristics of the underlying hardware. However, existing PUF-based authentication schemes for RFID do not support mutual authentication, are often vulnerable to emulation and denial-of service attacks, and allow only for a limited number of authentications. In this paper, we present a new PUF-based authentication scheme that overcomes these drawbacks: it supports PUF-based mutual authentication between tokens and readers, is resistant to emulation attacks, and supports an unlimited number of authentications without requiring the reader to store a large number of PUF challenge/response pairs. In this context, we introduce reverse fuzzy extractors, a new approach to correct noise in PUF responses that allows for extremely lightweight implementations on the token. Our proof-of-concept implementation shows that our scheme is suitable for resource-constrained devices.

Abstract. Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are an emerging technology and have been proposed as central building blocks in a variety of cryptographic protocols and security architectures. However, the security features of PUFs are still under investigation: Evaluation results in the literature are difficult to compare due to varying test conditions, different analysis methods and the fact that representative data sets are publicly unavailable. In this paper, we present the first large-scale security analysis of ASIC implementations of the five most popular intrinsic electronic PUF types, including arbiter, ring oscillator, SRAM, flip-flop and latch PUFs. Our analysis is based on PUF data obtained at different operating conditions from 96 ASICs housing multiple PUF instances, which have been manufactured in TSMC 65 nm CMOS technology. In this context, we present an evaluation methodology and quantify the robustness and unpredictability properties of PUFs. Since all PUFs have been implemented in the same ASIC and analyzed with the same evaluation methodology, our results allow for the first time a fair comparison of their properties.

When fabricating battery electrodes, their properties are strongly determined by the adjusted drying parameters. This does not only affect their microstructure in terms of adhesion, but also influences cell performance. The reason is found to be the binder transported to the surface during drying. Herein, it is shown that when thicker electrodes are processed, new challenges arise. On the one hand, loss of adhesion associated with certain drying conditions becomes a more serious problem; on the other hand, cracking occurs at a certain drying rate and with increasing electrode thickness.