Abstract. Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are an emerging technology and have been proposed as central building blocks in a variety of cryptographic protocols and security architectures. However, the security features of PUFs are still under investigation: Evaluation results in the literature are difficult to compare due to varying test conditions, different analysis methods and the fact that representative data sets are publicly unavailable. In this paper, we present the first large-scale security analysis of ASIC implementations of the five most popular intrinsic electronic PUF types, including arbiter, ring oscillator, SRAM, flip-flop and latch PUFs. Our analysis is based on PUF data obtained at different operating conditions from 96 ASICs housing multiple PUF instances, which have been manufactured in TSMC 65 nm CMOS technology. In this context, we present an evaluation methodology and quantify the robustness and unpredictability properties of PUFs. Since all PUFs have been implemented in the same ASIC and analyzed with the same evaluation methodology, our results allow for the first time a fair comparison of their properties.
Abstract. Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are security primitives that exploit intrinsic random physical variations of hardware components. In the recent years, many security solutions based on PUFs have been proposed, including identification/authentication schemes, key storage and hardware-entangled cryptography. Existing PUF instantiations typically exhibit a static challenge/response behavior, while many practical applications would benefit from reconfigurable PUFs. Examples include the revocation or update of "secrets" in PUF-based key storage or cryptographic primitives based on PUFs. In this paper, we present the concept of Logically Reconfigurable PUFs (LR-PUFs) that allow changing the challenge/response behavior without physically replacing or modifying the underlying PUF. We present two efficient LR-PUF constructions and evaluate their performance and security. In this context, we introduce a formal security model for LR-PUFs. Finally, we discuss several practical applications of LR-PUFs focusing on lightweight solutions for resource-constrained embedded devices, in particular RFIDs.
Abstract-Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is considered as the best candidate for Public-Key Cryptosystems (PKC) for ubiquitous security. Recently, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) based on Binary Edwards Curves (BEC) has been proposed and it shows several interesting properties, e.g., completeness and security against certain exceptional-points attacks. In this paper, we propose a hardware implementation of the BEC for extremely constrained devices. The wcoordinates and Montgomery powering ladder are used. Next, we also give techniques to reduce the register file size, which is the largest component of the embedded core. Thirdly, we apply gated clocking to reduce the overall power consumption. The implementation has a size of 13,427 Gate Equivalent (GE), and 149.5 ms are required for one point multiplication. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first hardware implementation of binary Edwards curves.
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