2019
DOI: 10.1007/s10957-019-01574-z
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On the Generic Structure and Stability of Stackelberg Equilibria

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Cited by 2 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…Still, this remains an open question as the function giving 1's value for a strategy x given that 2 best responds to it according to her payoff function is discontinuous, and the computation of discontinuities is a harder problem than computing a Stackelberg Equilibrium. Showing that there only exists a finite number of discontinuities (which was proven for the one-dimensional case for a dense set of payoff functions [28]) should enable the use of an ϵ-greedy version of BiDOO asymptotically converging towards an ϵ-Stackelberg equilibrium for any α-Hölder game.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Still, this remains an open question as the function giving 1's value for a strategy x given that 2 best responds to it according to her payoff function is discontinuous, and the computation of discontinuities is a harder problem than computing a Stackelberg Equilibrium. Showing that there only exists a finite number of discontinuities (which was proven for the one-dimensional case for a dense set of payoff functions [28]) should enable the use of an ϵ-greedy version of BiDOO asymptotically converging towards an ϵ-Stackelberg equilibrium for any α-Hölder game.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%