Self-consistent Feedback Stackelberg Equilibria for Infinite Horizon Stochastic Games

Bressan, Alberto; Jiang, Yilun

doi:10.1007/s13235-019-00329-9

Dyn Games Appl

2019

DOI: 10.1007/s13235-019-00329-9

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Self-consistent Feedback Stackelberg Equilibria for Infinite Horizon Stochastic Games

Alberto Bressan

Yilun Jiang

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2024

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Cited by 3 publications

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The determination of the price of capital goods: A differential game approach

Guerrazzi,

Candido

2024

Manage Decis Econ

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In this paper, we address the determinants of the price of newly installed productive capacity. Specifically, we develop a differential game in which a competitive producer of consumption goods deals with a seller of capital goods endowed with market power. From a theoretical perspective, we demonstrate that an open‐loop Stackelberg equilibrium requires the producer of consumption goods to be more impatient than the seller of capital goods. Thereafter, we show that our theoretical setting can replicate the countercyclical pattern of the relative price of capital goods as well as its negative relationship with the investment–output ratio.

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The determination of the price of capital goods: A differential game approach

Guerrazzi,

Candido

2024

Manage Decis Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Numerical Simulation of Non-cooperative and Cooperative Equilibrium Solutions for a Stochastic Government Debt Stabilization Game

et al. 2021

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On the Generic Structure and Stability of Stackelberg Equilibria

Bressan

Jiang

2019

J Optim Theory Appl

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Self-consistent Feedback Stackelberg Equilibria for Infinite Horizon Stochastic Games

Cited by 3 publications

References 13 publications

The determination of the price of capital goods: A differential game approach

The determination of the price of capital goods: A differential game approach

Numerical Simulation of Non-cooperative and Cooperative Equilibrium Solutions for a Stochastic Government Debt Stabilization Game

On the Generic Structure and Stability of Stackelberg Equilibria

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