On the Impact of Package Selection in Combinatorial Auctions: An Experimental Study in the Context of Spectrum Auction Design

Scheffel, Tobias; Ziegler, Georg C.; Bichler, Martin

doi:10.1017/9781316471609.029

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Similarly, in another set of simulation experiments, Dunford et al () observed very high AE (above 95%) for Nucleolus‐based auction designs. In another set of laboratory experiments on an iterative combinatorial auction, Scheffel et al () found high AE (above 90%) and low‐profit extraction rates (less than 20%). For single‐shot combinatorial auctions, Goeree et al () observed AE levels higher than 90% in their laboratory experiments.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Does It Pay to Increase Competition in Combinatorial Conservation Auctions?

Iftekhar

Hailu

Lindner

2014

Canadian J Agri Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Conservation auctions allow landholders to propose conservation projects and associated payments (bids) for consideration by a conservation agency. Recently, the application of iterative combinatorial auction designs has been proposed to improve outcomes of conservation auctions. In combinatorial auctions, landholders are allowed to offer projects each of which involves activities aimed at providing one or multiple services. An iterative format allows bidders the opportunity to gradually explore the type of projects they want to offer, with this process being facilitated through price feedback provided based on intermediate auction round results. Auction designs vary with the type of feedback and respond differently to market conditions. At present there is a lack of information about their performance in markets with varying degrees of competition (in terms of number of bidders and level of target). Therefore, using an agent‐based simulation model, we evaluate a number of iterative auction designs. We observe that a higher degree of competition leads to a higher auction efficiency. In a high competition environment, efficiency outcomes tend to be less sensitive to auction design choices. Therefore, an auctioneer could enjoy freedom in design choice if adequate competition could be ensured. In weak competition environments, however, some auction designs perform better than others.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Does It Pay to Increase Competition in Combinatorial Conservation Auctions?

Iftekhar

Hailu

Lindner

2014

Canadian J Agri Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This has a negative impact on revenues. Furthermore, Scheffel et al (2012), report on laboratory experiments comparing the Combinatorial Clock auction, the Hierarchical Package Bidding format, and an auction format with pseudo dual prices in large value models with 18 items. They found the limited number of packages that bidders evaluate to be the greatest barrier to efficiency, much more so than differences in the auction formats.…”

Section: Truthful Biddingmentioning

confidence: 99%

A review of radio spectrum combinatorial clock auctions

Mochón

Sáez

2017

Telecommunications Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper surveys a decade of Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCAs) to allocate radio spectrum licenses from their inception to 2016. Although all CCAs share a common structure (first an allocation stage and then, an assignment stage), regulators have tailored key variables depending on their spectrum policies and market structures. We identify these variables, such as: spectrum packaging policy, reserve price, demand limit, activity rule, transparency and pricing rule. We also analyze the different ways in which regulators can design them along with their implications. This theoretical work is accompanied by a review of the practical implementation decisions in each actual auction and final outcomes. Although all the information is public, it is not easy to find because it is highly disaggregated. Flnally, after having identified advantages and disadvantages in this auction model, we present some proposals to improve the actual mechanism.

show abstract

On the Impact of Package Selection in Combinatorial Auctions: An Experimental Study in the Context of Spectrum Auction Design

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Does It Pay to Increase Competition in Combinatorial Conservation Auctions?

Does It Pay to Increase Competition in Combinatorial Conservation Auctions?

A review of radio spectrum combinatorial clock auctions

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About