A review of radio spectrum combinatorial clock auctions

Abstract

This paper surveys a decade of Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCAs) to allocate radio spectrum licenses from their inception to 2016. Although all CCAs share a common structure (first an allocation stage and then, an assignment stage), regulators have tailored key variables depending on their spectrum policies and market structures. We identify these variables, such as: spectrum packaging policy, reserve price, demand limit, activity rule, transparency and pricing rule. We also analyze the different ways in which regulators can design them along with their implications. This theoretical work is accompanied by a review of the practical implementation decisions in each actual auction and final outcomes. Although all the information is public, it is not easy to find because it is highly disaggregated. Flnally, after having identified advantages and disadvantages in this auction model, we present some proposals to improve the actual mechanism.

Dividing the Indivisible : Algorithms, Empirical Advances, and Complexity Results for Value-Maximizing Combinatorial Assignment Problems

“…Such neighboring control may influence interference levels and, consequently, service quality. (For a comprehensive understanding of spectrum band allocation and its associated combinatorial clock auctions, please consult [126] for a detailed survey. Additionally, work on spectrum band auctions [125] offers valuable insights into this application.…”

Challenges Associated with Implementing 5G in Manufacturing

“…In accordance with European law, the radio spectrum is awarded to a technology and is applied in a technology neutral manner, this means that licensees may use the radio spectrum as they see fit provided that they comply with the relevant applicable harmonized standards in the band in which they communicate. In Ireland, radio frequencies are treated as a national resource and their licensing is managed by the national communications Regulator, ComReg [33][34][35][36][37].…”

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“…Moreover, in the case of weak competition, it exposes the government to low revenues and the need to sell the license at a price below its social value, which harms consumers. On the other hand, too high reserve price may discourage new entrants, which reduces the competition and increases the chances of unsold lots (Mochon, and Saez, 2017). Too high minimum prices are often the cause of unsuccessful auctions, where all or part of the spectrum remains unsold, generating losses for the public.…”