On the (in)accuracy of economic observations: An assessment of trends in the reliability of international trade statistics

Exploring the Intensive and Extensive Margins of World Trade

“…However, upon extensive scrutiny of the DoTS, Dyadic trade data typically pose a further data problem in that information provided by exporting countries often does not fit the data released by importing countries; see for instance Rozanski and Yeats (1994). However, international organizations have set up a number of task forces to harmonize national standards and definitions 7 , so that one should expect data quality to have improved over time.…”

On the Accuracy of Latin American Trade Statistics: A Nonparametric Test for 1925

“…For instance, Makhoul and Otterstrom (1998) found that the quality of the OECD trade statistics is much better than that provided by the non-OECD in a relatively recent period such as 1980 to 1994. Also Rozansky and Yeats (1994 ) found that discrepancies between importers' and exporters' reports appear especially important for the less developed countries.…”

“…Among others, the studies of Naya and Morgan (1969), Yeats (1990), Rozansky and Yeats (1994) and, Makhoul and Otterstrom (1998), show that the accuracy of trade statistics provided by developed countries is higher than that of the developing countries. For instance, Makhoul and Otterstrom (1998) found that the quality of the OECD trade statistics is much better than that provided by the non-OECD in a relatively recent period such as 1980 to 1994.…”

“…The issue of the (in)accuracy of the foreign trade statistics remains in the economics, development and trade literature to the present day (Parniczky (1980); Rozansky and Yeats (1994); Makhoul and Otterstrom (1998) ). This paper proposes a nonparametric test in order to establish the level of accuracy of the Latin American foreign trade statistics when contrasted with the trade statistics of the main trading partners.…”

Discrepancies in forest products trade statistics

“…In these coun- Sostad 1961, Naya and Morgan 1969, Yeats 1978, Parniczky 1980, Doan 1983, Blades and Ivanov 1985, Durst et al 1986, IMF 1987, Rozanski and Yeats 1994, Luppold 1995, Makhoul and Otterstrom 1998 tries, exporters have an incentive to collude with importers to under-value export shipments, either directly or by mislabelling the species or grade of product being exported, with the difference in value usually being deposited into an off-shore account controlled by the exporter. Similarly, exporters have an incentive to mis-specify high value products (e.g., mouldings) as lower-value products (e.g., lumber).…”