On the Just Distribution of Land Use Rights

Abstract

The current system of decision making in land use law is not transparent and is open to biased or personal corruption. This gives rise to the possibility of unequal treatment under the law, especially given the judicial reluctance to interfere in reviewing the decision making process. Our solution is an auction mechanism to overcome these problems, under which the local government would be bound to award land use rights to the highest bidder and where offers will be examined in light of their contribution to the society’s best interest. Such mechanism has possible benefits in terms of transparency and insurance against favouritism or arbitrariness. The auction mechanism proposes the use of a simple metric (i.e., revealed private value of the competing claims) by which the local government can give a transparent, non-arbitrary, observable, and verifiable response. This mechanism, so we argue, treats each and every person’s choices with equal concern and respect. In this sense, the auction is procedurally fair by being conducted between potential bargainers that enjoy equality in background conditions and when means for offsetting brute bad lack are utilized.

The Social Deal: Urban regeneration as an opportunity for In-Place Social Mobility

“…Today, urban regeneration is considered to be a standard means of producing a new housing stock in city centers, while also improving public areas and infrastructure (Zheng, Shen, & Wang, 2014). The assumption fueling the public system is that the development of private property will lead to the revitalization of urban spaces (Hyra, 2012; Levine-Schnur & Ferdman, 2015; Rosen & Walks, 2015) and to increased demand for sites in the city center, and in so doing will improve the appearance of the city and the economic activity that occurs within it (Singhal, Berry, & McGreal, 2009).…”

“…This refers to the agreement between the local authority and developers, in which developers take upon themselves planning obligations – known also as linked development or community benefit agreements (Geva & Rosen, 2018) – such as expanded public planning or taxation undertakings in exchange for building rights. The architectural model used in these deals is meant to attract a wealthy population and encourage investments and is therefore typically directed at prestigious and exceptionally tall high-rise apartment buildings through the relaxation of provisions of the overall plans (Levine-Schnur & Ferdman, 2015; Margalit, 2013).…”

“…Others have argued that such development does not amount to urban regeneration, which is supposed to include strategies for the development and creation of infrastructure in urban areas, as it results only in the regeneration of isolated residential sites and a hollowing of the goals of urban planning (Alexander, 2016; Margalit, 2014; Purcell, 2013). Others have considered the ethical and fair-minded aspects of this mode of allocation of land use rights as public goods (Levine-Schnur, 2018; Levine-Schnur & Ferdman, 2015).…”

Sharing the unearned increment: Divergent Outcomes in Toronto and São Paulo

“…While the justification for LVC is often not usually improved equity, it is useful to explore whether LVC measures include a redistributional component. For Levine-Schnur and Ferdman (2015), distributional concerns are relevant in the context of negotiations between local governments and developers. When piecemeal changes to zoning provisions result from requests from developers conditional on providing public contributions negotiated by local governments, distributional concerns may be taken into account.…”

“…As Levine-Schnur and Ferdman (2015) argue, distributional concerns matter in issues of land use and property rights. Juxtaposing such processes through debates on land rent, the urban commons and the social function of property, it becomes possible to highlight the role of equity to move towards a language of rights, entitlement and justice in LVC discourse.…”