Background Early in the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, governments implemented exceptional public health measures (PHMs) in the face of uncertainty. This study aimed to compare mitigation policies implemented by Israel and their timing in the first wave of the pandemic to those of other countries, and to assess whether country characteristics such as democracy, trust, education, economic strength and healthcare reserve were associated with decision-making. Methods PHMs and pre-pandemic characteristics, using internationally accepted indices, of 50 countries were collected from 1/1/2020-30/06/2020; and associations between them were assessed. Time to implementation of these measures was compared among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation (OECD) nations. Log-rank test was used for univariate analysis. Cox regression was performed to assess the independent contribution of pre-pandemic characteristics to time-to-implementation of measures. Correlations between timing of specific measures and COVID-19 mortality at 60 days were assessed. Results Israel ranked in the upper third of the OECD in swiftness to implementation of eight of the ten measures compared. In univariate survival analysis, countries with an education level below the OECD median were more likely to implement a lockdown (p-value = 0.043) and to close restaurants and entertainment venues (p-value = 0.007) when compared to countries above the OECD median. In Cox regression models, controlling for geographic location, democracy level above the OECD median was associated with a longer time-to-implementation of a lockdown (HR=0.35, 95% CI=0.14-0.88, p-value=0.025). Similarly, a high level of GDP per capita was inversely associated with closing schools; and a high level of education inversely associated with closure of restaurants and entertainment venues. Earlier initiation of all PHMs was associated with lower mortality at 60 days, controlling for geographic location. Conclusions Israel's initial response to the pandemic was relatively quick, and may have been facilitated by its geographic isolation. Countries with lower pre-pandemic socio-economic indices were quicker to initiate forced social distancing. Early initiation of PHMs was associated with reduced mortality in the short run. Timing of initiation of measures relative to the country-specific spread of disease is a significant factor contributing to short-term early local pandemic control, perhaps more than the exact measures implemented. It is important to note that this study is limited to the initial pandemic response. Furthermore, it does not take into account the broader long-term effects of certain PHMs, which should be a focus of further research.

The current system of decision making in land use law is not transparent and is open to biased or personal corruption. This gives rise to the possibility of unequal treatment under the law, especially given the judicial reluctance to interfere in reviewing the decision making process. Our solution is an auction mechanism to overcome these problems, under which the local government would be bound to award land use rights to the highest bidder and where offers will be examined in light of their contribution to the society’s best interest. Such mechanism has possible benefits in terms of transparency and insurance against favouritism or arbitrariness. The auction mechanism proposes the use of a simple metric (i.e., revealed private value of the competing claims) by which the local government can give a transparent, non-arbitrary, observable, and verifiable response. This mechanism, so we argue, treats each and every person’s choices with equal concern and respect. In this sense, the auction is procedurally fair by being conducted between potential bargainers that enjoy equality in background conditions and when means for offsetting brute bad lack are utilized.

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Does an Occupying Power have a duty to protect private property rights of protected persons against acts of its own citizens? What is the extent of such a duty? This paper argues that under belligerent occupation, land disputes between individuals of both sides of the conflict are

In this article I use a unique hand-coded dataset of all expropriation exercises in Jerusalem over a twenty-five-year period to test the distribution of the expropriation burden across political communities. I identify the ethnoreligious group to which the impacted landowner belongs and the community that would benefit from the decision. I find that Palestinian property constitutes 38 percent of all land taken over the years, while only 10 percent of all land taken has been repurposed for their local community needs. Conversely, Jewish owners have contributed only 4 percent of all land taken while benefiting from 33 percent of the land taken for their community needs. I also find that land not owned by Jews has a higher propensity to be taken for citywide purposes by ten to twenty-three times than Jewish land, depending on the purpose and the type of property rights involved. This sharp gap can be attributed to the political power relations in the city. The case study enables me to test the relationship between weak property rights and infrastructure provision. As property rights are formally recorded and recognized selectively in some but not in all parts of the city, the article provides the first empirical evidence to the effect of weak property rights on the risk of expropriation. I find that the propensity for noncommunity purpose takings of nonformalized land for which Palestinians claim ownership but have no official records to is significantly higher when compared to formalized Palestinian land. This outcome contradicts the conventional wisdom in the literature that weak property rights help explain limited infrastructure development.