On the Links between Visual Knowledge and Naming: a Single Case Study of a Patient with a Category-specific Impairment for Living Things

Forde, Emer M. E.; Francis, Deborah; Riddoch, M. Jane; Humphreys, R.I. Rumiati and G.W.

doi:10.1080/026432997381538

Cited by 106 publications

(90 citation statements)

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“…The results of the speeded feature verification study provide strong evidence in support of feature-based accounts of conceptual knowledge (e.g., Caramazza, Hillis, Rapp, & Romani, 1990;Forde, Francis, Riddoch, Rumiati, & Humphreys, 1997;Humphreys, Riddoch, & Quinlan, 1988;McNamara & Miller, 1989). The results of the computational simulation further suggest that these features are represented in a nonfractionated distributed semantic system and that conceptual structure emerges out of this system as a result of correlational structure.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 52%

Distinctiveness and Correlation in Conceptual Structure: Behavioral and Computational Studies.

Randall

Moss

Rodd

et al. 2004

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cogni

178

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Patients with category-specific deficits have motivated a range of hypotheses about the structure of the conceptual system. One class of models claims that apparent category dissociations emerge from the internal structure of concepts rather than fractionation of the system into separate substores. This account claims that distinctive properties of concepts in the living domain are vulnerable because of their weak correlation with other features. Given the assumption that mutual activation among correlated properties produces faster activation in the normal system, the authors predicted a disadvantage for the distinctive features of living things for unimpaired adults. Results of a speeded feature verification study supported this prediction, as did a computational simulation in which networks mapped from orthography to semantics.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 52%

Distinctiveness and Correlation in Conceptual Structure: Behavioral and Computational Studies.

Randall

Moss

Rodd

et al. 2004

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cogni

178

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“…Similarly, in comparison to artefacts, he was still impaired on highly typical biological items corresponding to frequent, early acquired words. Thus, the impact of factors like familiarity, typicality, and word frequency, although significant, cannot fully account for ER's impairment.As in many previous similar case studies (Basso, Capitani, & Laiacona, 1988;Breedin, Saffran, & Coslett, 1992;Damasio, 1990; De Renzi & Luchelli, 1994;Forde et al, 1997;Hillis & Caramazza, 1991;Moss, Tyler, & Jennings, 1997;Sheridan & Humphreys, 1993;Silveri & Gainotti, 1988;Swales & Johnson, 1992;Warrington & Shallice, 1984), ER's impairment for biological things was not absolute. Indeed, he was able to recognise or name some of the line drawings and pictures of animals, fruits, vegetables, and food items, and, for unrecognised items, he displayed preserved information about superordinate category.…”

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confidence: 66%

“…Only tactile information concerning texture, weight, and shape could have helped her, but this was not the case. More recently, Forde et al (1997) observed that SRB was much poorer at naming real fruits or vegetables (57% correct) than real artefacts.…”

Section: Cognitive Neuropsychology 2002 19 (4) 323 Category-specifimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The differential diagnostic value of sensorial vs. functional-associative knowledge for living relative to nonliving things has been incorporated both within multiple (e.g., Warrington & McCarthy, 1983;Warrington & Shallice, 1984) and single semantic system models (e.g., Forde, Francis, Riddoch, Rumiati, & Humphreys, 1997;Humphreys, Lamonte, & Lloyd-Jones, 1995;Lloyd-Jones & Humphreys, 1997;Riddoch et al, 1988). The main difference between multiple vs. single semantic system models is the level at which the sensorial vs. nonsensorial features' opposition takes place, namely, within the semantic system itself, or not.…”

Section: Downloaded By [Archives and Bibliothèques De L'ulb] At 06:20 1mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Several cases of category-specific deficit for biological things also displayed an important impairment in drawing affected category exemplars from memory (e.g., De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1994;Forde et al, 1997;Sartori & Job, 1988;Sheridan & Humphreys, 1993). Two such tests were presented to ER: memory-drawing and drawing completion.…”

Section: Cognitive Neuropsychology 2002 19 (4) Kolinsky Et Almentioning

confidence: 99%

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The fur of the crocodile and the mooing sheep: A study of a patient with a category-specific impairment for biological things

Kolinsky¹,

Fery²,

Messina³

et al. 2002

Cognitive Neuropsychology

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We report a single case study of a brain-damaged patient, ER, who showed a remarkably consistent category-specific deficit for living things. His impairment was observed across tasks (naming, definition, matching, drawing from memory, questionnaires), input modalities (visual, verbal, nonverbal auditory), and output modalities (verbal vs. pointing or visual matching responses) as well as for different types of knowledge. Although visual knowledge of living things was severely affected, his category-specific impairment in nonverbal sound recognition is inconsistent with models of category-specific deficits based on pre-semantic visual descriptions. ER's deficit cannot fully be explained by item typicality, word frequency, visual complexity, homomorphy, age of acquisition, value to perceiver, or modality of transaction. Furthermore, in ER, contextual cues were even slightly detrimental for the recognition of animals. ER's naming and recognition errors were constrained by the categorical structure of the knowledge base: In most cases they respected both the second-and first-order superordinates. In particular, ER's knowledge of shared categorical properties related to biological function was almost spared. This result is compatible with the idea that, for living things, shared functional properties and shared perceptual properties are strongly correlated. Feature-based models assuming perceptual vs. functional semantic components cannot account for ER's deficit, since for living things he was impaired on both kinds of features to a similar extent. ER's behaviour is quite consistent with the notion that conceptual knowledge is organised categorically in the brain, with one or several specialised subsystems for biologically related entities. 301Requests for reprints should be addressed to Régine Kolinsky, Unité de Recherche en Neurosciences Cognitives (UNESCOG), Université Libre de Bruxelles, CP 191, Av. F.D. Roosevelt, 50, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium (Fax: 32-2-650.22.09; Email: rkolins@ulb.ac.be).We wish to thank Tim Shallice for very helpful discussions on a former version of the manuscript, as well as the Editor and two anonymous reviewers for their very constructive comments. We also thank all the people who participated in the present study, including the members of the Research Unit in Cognitive Neuroscience and of the Laboratoire de Psychologie Expérimentale of the Université Libre de Bruxelles, who were prepared to spend several hours filling in questionnaires. This work was supported by A.F.R.F.C.-F.N.R.S. grant. Downloaded by [Archives & Bibliothèques de l'ULB] at 06:20 10 July 2015The observation of specific semantic memory disorders, i.e., that some patients exhibit a selective loss of knowledge of items from certain categories, for example biological (or living) entities, by comparison with nonbiological (or non-living) objects, has generated a large debate about the internal organisation of the semantic system (see recent reviews, e.g., in Caramazza, 1998;Forde & Humphreys, 1999;Humphreys & Forde, 2001;...

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Cognitive Neuroscience

Humphreys

2002

Stevens' Handbook of Experimental Psychology

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The ability to maintain information online beyond sensory stimulation is regarded as a key contribution of working memory to goaldirected behaviour. It is widely accepted that sustained neural activity is a key mechanism of stimulus maintenance, but it is unclear to what extent the neural generators of sustained activity change from stimulus-encoding to maintenance. Using eventrelated potentials in humans, we show that, in a delayed match-to-sample task, slow shifts over parieto-occipital electrode sites had a different topography and polarity during encoding and delay maintenance of images depicting scenes. This clearly demonstrates that neural generators of sustained activity associated with stimulus-encoding and delay maintenance differed, and that the change between these generators occurred time-locked to the onset of the delay period. We also investigated how monetary reward incentives modulated the amplitude and topography of sustained delay activity and the ability to suppress irrelevant distracting information during the delay. Reward incentives improved maintenance performance and this was correlated with an expansion of the parieto-occipital electrode sites that were entrained into sustained delay activity (rather than improved distractor suppression), suggesting that under the influence of reward, the parieto-occipital regions that contributed to delay maintenance expanded in size.

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On the Links between Visual Knowledge and Naming: a Single Case Study of a Patient with a Category-specific Impairment for Living Things

Cited by 106 publications

References 0 publications

Distinctiveness and Correlation in Conceptual Structure: Behavioral and Computational Studies.

Distinctiveness and Correlation in Conceptual Structure: Behavioral and Computational Studies.

The fur of the crocodile and the mooing sheep: A study of a patient with a category-specific impairment for biological things

Cognitive Neuroscience

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