On the Nature of Repressed Contents–A Working-Through of John Searle’s Critique

Talvitie, Vesa; Ihanus, Juhani

doi:10.1080/15294145.2003.10773417

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…From the viewpoints of neurophysiology and philosophy of the mind, this idea is difficult to accept (see Searle, 1992, pp. 151–173; O'Brien & Jureidini, 2002; Talvitie & Ihanus, 2003).…”

Section: On the Phenomenon Of Repression – And Its Explanationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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From the repression of contents to the rules of the (narrative) self: A present‐day cognitive view of the Freudian phenomenon of repressed contents

Talvitie

Tiitinen

2006

Psychol Psychother

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In psychoanalysis, it is commonly thought that ideas (desires, fears, etc.) may be repressed, and that they can be made conscious. In this article, we shall apply cognitive viewpoints and assert that ideas do not exist in the unconscious as 'ready made', and thus repressed ideas cannot be 'brought' into consciousness. We suggest that the contents of consciousness are formed by processes on four levels: (1) unconscious brain processes, (2) the level of consciousness, (3) the level of self-consciousness, and (4) the level of narrative self-consciousness. From this point of view, the absence (or repression) of certain contents appears to be due to the missing of processes on Levels 1-4. Consequently, repressed contents appear in consciousness when appropriate processes take place. When studied in terms of our four-level model, repression may be treated as part of the study of the self. By applying the viewpoint of the self to the phenomenon of repression, the danger of the homunculus problem can be avoided. It also becomes apparent that certain fundamental problems met in the study of the self are the ones that Freud tried to solve in his meta-psychological writings.

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“…From the viewpoints of neurophysiology and philosophy of the mind, this idea is difficult to accept (see Searle, 1992, pp. 151–173; O'Brien & Jureidini, 2002; Talvitie & Ihanus, 2003).…”

Section: On the Phenomenon Of Repression – And Its Explanationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The major problem with Freud's explanation is that it is difficult to tell where and in what form the repressed contents exist (Searle, 1992; Talvitie & Ihanus, 2003). However, it does not make much sense to argue decade after decade about those problems (‘Is Freud really dead?’).…”

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confidence: 99%

From the repression of contents to the rules of the (narrative) self: A present‐day cognitive view of the Freudian phenomenon of repressed contents

Talvitie

Tiitinen

2006

Psychol Psychother

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“…On the one hand, in line with harsh criticism against psychoanalysis in general (e.g., Crews, 1998;Gross, 1978;Grü nbaum, 1984Grü nbaum, , 1998Grü nbaum, , 2002Macmillan, 1997Macmillan, , 2001, numerous investigators question the validity of repression, claiming that it needs to be abandoned (e.g., Bonanno & Keuler, 1998;Court & Court, 2001;Pendergrast, 1997;Piper, Pope, & Borowiecki, 2000; H. G. Pope, Oliva, & Hudson, 1999). On the other hand, psychoanalysis continues to be one of the central theories of psychopathology, and many investigators believe that repression is a valid concept (e.g., Bowers & Farvolden, 1996;Brown, Scheflin, & Whitfield, 1999;Cheit, 1998;Eagle, 2000aEagle, , 2000bTalvitie & Ihanus, 2003;Westen, 1998aWesten, , 1999.…”

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confidence: 99%

Does Repression Exist? Memory, Pathogenic, Unconscious and Clinical Evidence

Rofé

2008

Review of General Psychology

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The current dispute regarding the existence of repression has mainly focused on whether people remember or forget trauma. Repression, however, is a multidimensional construct, which, in addition to the memory aspect, consists of pathogenic effects on adjustment and the unconscious. Accordingly, in order to arrive at a more accurate decision regarding the existence of repression, studies relevant to all three areas are reviewed. Moreover, since psychoanalysis regards repression as a key factor in accounting for the development and treatment of neurotic disorders, relevant research from these two domains are also taken into account. This comprehensive evaluation reveals little empirical justification for maintaining the psychoanalytic concept of repression.

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“…In the present context, one difference is especially relevant: in the domain of cognitive orientation, the nature of the unconscious is presented in terms of neural processess and structures. These neurophysiological matters can be described on different levels of abstraction, but (in the domain of cognitive [neuro]science orientation) virtually nobody thinks that the unconscious is something other than neurophysiology (Searle, 1992;Talvitie & Ihanus, 2003). In psychoanalytic thinking, however, the unconscious is thought to be something more.…”

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Biting the Bullet

Talvitie

Ihanus

2005

Theory & Psychology

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The idea of unconscious fantasy plays a central role in psychoanalysis. In terms of cognitive orientation, however, the logic behind it is difficult to determine because psychoanalysis has not succeeded in establishing how and where such fantasies exist. This article introduces the reasons why psychoanalysts think in terms of unconscious fantasies: the very notion facilitates the interconnection of the analysand's patterns of behavior and her/his emerging contents of consciousness. The authors put forward arguments in favor of an instrumentalist view of unconscious fantasies, and suggest that the talk about them abstracts the functioning of the brain. In the spirit of neuropsychoanalysis, a connection is also created between the phenomena found in clinical psychoanalytic practice and the findings of neuroscience and the empirical study of implicit knowledge.

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On the Nature of Repressed Contents–A Working-Through of John Searle’s Critique

Cited by 3 publications

References 24 publications

From the repression of contents to the rules of the (narrative) self: A present‐day cognitive view of the Freudian phenomenon of repressed contents

From the repression of contents to the rules of the (narrative) self: A present‐day cognitive view of the Freudian phenomenon of repressed contents

Does Repression Exist? Memory, Pathogenic, Unconscious and Clinical Evidence

Biting the Bullet

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