is work presents Information eoretic HotStu (IT-HS), a new optimally resilient protocol for solving Byzantine Agreement in partial synchrony with information theoretic security guarantees. In particular, IT-HS does not depend on any PKI or common setup assumptions and is resilient to computationally unbounded adversaries. IT-HS is based on the Primary-Backup view-based paradigm.In IT-HS, in each view, and in each view change, each party sends only a constant number of words to every other party. is yields an O (n 2 ) word and message complexity in each view. In addition, IT-HS requires just O (1) persistent local storage and O (n) transient local storage. Finally, like all Primary-Backup view-based protocols in partial synchrony, a er the system becomes synchronous, all nonfaulty parties decide on a value in the rst view a nonfaulty leader is chosen. Moreover, like PBFT and HotStu , IT-HS is optimistically responsive: with a nonfaulty leader, parties decide as quickly as the network allows them to do so, without regard for the known upper bound on network delay. Our work improves in multiple dimensions upon the information theoretic version of PBFT presented by Miguel Castro, and can be seen as an information theoretic variant of the HotStu paradigm.