On the persuadability of memory: Is changing people's memories no more than changing their minds?

Abstract

This is the accepted version of the article in British Journal of Psychology, which has been published in final form at http://dx

Defending and reducing belief in memories: An experimental laboratory analogue

“…Future studies could use manipulations of social variables such as credibility, social pressure, and so forth, to explore additional effects of memorial feedback on belief in occurrence and recollection, along with different cognitive/social/personality characteristics. As has recently been demonstrated, conceiving the effect of social feedback on memory in terms of persuasion might prove useful as well (Nash, Wheeler, & Hope, 2015). Such factors may prove valuable in situations when the quality of memory reports are evaluated, such as during forensic proceedings, and might shed further light on debated topics such as false confessions and retractors.…”

Adults’ retractions of childhood sexual abuse allegations: high-stakes and the (in)validation of recollection

“…As Mazzoni and Kirsch (2002) noted, recollection does not necessarily follow from belief, as many people believe things happened to them that they do not consciously recollect (e.g., that they were fed after they were born; a possibility also formalised in Scoboria et al's, 2004, nested construct model). It seems that, for some retractors at least, the same may be true; their belief about the past was more important than whether they could recollect any instances of abuse (see also Nash et al, 2015). Furthermore, social contextual factors were critical in both the endorsement, and subsequent repudiation, of their beliefs and recollections of abuse.…”

“…Conversely, upon leaving such an environment, it is possible that revising one's belief is also "locally adaptive", enabling one to distance oneself from earlier claims (i.e., "I was the victim of poor therapy"). In other words, beliefs can be context specific, and vacillate depending on the environment one is in (see also Nash, Wheeler, & Hope, 2015).…”

Theoretical and applied issues regarding autobiographical belief and recollection

“…The increased interest in the distinction between believing and recollecting can be seen in the following. First of all, an increasing number of researchers are considering the theoretical implications of a variety of forms of belief and decision making in the area of remembering (Arango-Munoz, 2013;Blank, 2009;Foley, 2015;Nash, Wheeler, & Hope, 2015). Furthermore, an expanding body of empirical research illustrates the manners by which individuals debate occurrence, accuracy, and ownership of individual recollections (Brown, Caderao, Fields, & Marsh, 2015;Clark-Foos, Brewer, & Marsh, 2015;Scoboria et al, 2015;Sheen, Kemp, & Rubin, 2001).…”