On the possibility of principled moral compromise

Abstract

Simon May has argued that the notion of a principled compromise is incoherent. Reasons to compromise are always in his view strategic: though we think that the position we defend is still the right one, we compromise on this view in order to avoid the undesirable consequences that might flow from not compromising. I argue against May that there are indeed often principled reasons to compromise, and that these reasons are in fact multiple. First, compromises evince respect for persons that we have reason to think of as our epistemic peers, and acknowledgement of our own finitudes as moral reasoners. Second, compromises are often made morally necessary by the shortfalls that unavoidably separate democratic institutions from democratic ideals. Third, compromises express a desirable form of democratic community. And fourth, compromises are often justified from a consequentialist point of view, in that they allow for the realization of values that would not be realized as well by the failure to compromise.

(Bio)Ethics in a Pluralistic Society

“…What happens next if parties disagree with each other about the right course is usually unaddressed in bioethical discourse. In his paper "On the possibility of principled moral compromise" [19], Weinstock describes three broad ways in which decisions are made as to what to do next. a compromise is a position that, with respect to the issue at hand, is from the point of view of parties locked in debate or negotiation inferior to the positions that both (or all) bring to a decision making process (a negotiation, an election, or more trivially a decision-oriented discussion among friends), but which both have reason to accept instead of the position they favour.…”

Majority Rule, Compromise and the Democratic Legitimacy of Referendums

“…Each of these compromises can be related to the content independent democratic ethos of avoiding dominating your fellow citizens in circumstances where disagreement is reasonable (Bellamy , ch 4). If I recognise that all citizens are entitled to be viewed as equally reliable reasoners about our collective interest to me, and that we all, myself included, are partial to our own perspectives, so that no person or group of persons can claim infallibility in assessing complex policy issues, then – assuming all voters have an equal stake in how the community is run – even if I disagree with my fellow citizens, I will have a moral motive for seeking to include their views not only in the process of decision making, showing them equal respect, but also in the collective decision itself, showing equal concern (Weinstock ). Add to that uncertainty as to what the most preferred view of a putative majority is – or even what the majority is – then, it becomes important to try and integrate minority views, not for pragmatic or self‐interested reasons – say, so minority representatives can gain an unearned place at the top table – but for reasons of sustaining a democratic community based on the non‐dominating virtues of showing each other equal concern and respect (Bellamy ).…”

The Ethics of Political Alliance

“…29 On this technical use of the term 'consensus', see Weinstock (2013 31 See Lawson in Nandy et al; also: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/sep/18/labours-lisa-nandyurges-party-to-ditch-tribalism; https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/nov/16/paddy-ashdown-urges-britishprogressive-centre-to-unite. collectives should be maintained in a condition of alliance therefore, while merger should be avoided so that these tendencies towards 'tribalism' do not reappear on a larger scale.…”