On the Resilience of Key Agreement Protocols to Key Compromise Impersonation

Strangio, Maurizio Adriano

doi:10.1007/11774716_19

Cited by 29 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 16 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…those in [6,5,25,30]). The reason is that, the partnership in these security models are defined based mathcing conversations, so that two oracles are partnered only if they possess the same protocol transcripts (or matching conversations).…”

Section: Security Analysismentioning

confidence: 95%

On the Security of Three Versions of the WAI Protocol in Chinese WLAN Implementation Plan

Tang

2007

2007 Second International Conference on Communications and Networking in China

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper we investigate the security properties of three versions of the WAI protocol in Chinese WLAN implementation plan. We first revisit the security analysis that has been done to the version 1 and 2. we show that the security proof given by Li, Moon, and Ma is incorrect and the alternative protocol EWAP of Zhang and Ma is insecure. We further analyse the third version of the WAI protocol and prove its security in the Canetti-Krawczyk model. In addition, we also provide some practical security analysis of this version.

show abstract

Section: Security Analysismentioning

confidence: 95%

On the Security of Three Versions of the WAI Protocol in Chinese WLAN Implementation Plan

Tang

2007

2007 Second International Conference on Communications and Networking in China

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In general, it is difficult to formally prove that a protocol is KCI-resilient, the BR93 security model [3,4] offers no formalization of KCI resilience. Indeed, it is easier to find some specific message that demonstrates that the property does not hold at all [8].…”

Section: Key Compromise Impersonation Attack On the Protocolmentioning

confidence: 96%

On the security of certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol

Hou

2009

2009 IEEE International Symposium on IT in Medicine &Amp; Education

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Authenticated key agreement protocol is a fundamental building block for ensuring private communications between two or more parties over an insecure network. Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) combines the advantage of the identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) and the traditional PKI. In the recent work, Wang et al.proposed an efficient two-party certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol from pairings used to protect the Web client/server communication. However, we found the scheme cannot withstand key compromise impersonation attack, and also, is vulnerable to one form of the man-in-the-middle attack --key replicating attack, thus it doesn't possess some desirable security attributes such as key compromise impersonation resilience and key integrity. We analyze the key replicating attack against the protocol in the BR93 security model in detail, and demonstrate that the protocol is not secure if the adversary was allowed to send a reveal query to reveal non-partner players who had accepted the same session key.

show abstract

“…We describe some desirable security properties of AKA protocol; for further details in the security properties of AKA, see previous studies 25,26, 28, 36, 40–47 PFS Resilience (PFS‐R) : If an eavesdropper might reveal any possible pairs of secret information without both private keys (static and ephemeral secret keys) owned by the party, it should not have any effect on the secrecy of previously established session keys. UKS : If party

\overset{A}{true}

wants to establish a secret key with

\overset{B}{true}

, it should not be possible that

\overset{B}{true}

is tricked into sharing a key with party

\overset{C}{true}

. Key control (KC) : Both of the parties should not be able to force the session key to a preselected value of their choice. Private key security : An adversary cannot learn the initiator's static private key even if she or he is able to learn all transient secrets in any of the initiator's session. Key confirmation : It is a guarantee exactly that the responder party

\overset{B}{true}

owns the same computed session key of the initiator party

\overset{A}{true}

in the same session.…”

Section: The Security Models and The Proposed Ecke Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cryptanalysis and improvement of the YAK protocol with formal security proof and security verification via Scyther

Mohammad

2020

Int J Communication

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Hao proposed the YAK as a robust key agreement based on public-key authentication, and the author claimed that the YAK protocol withstands all known attacks and therefore is secure against an extremely strong adversary. However, Toorani showed the security flaws in the YAK protocol. This paper shows that the YAK protocol cannot withstand the known key security attack, and its consequences lead us to introduce a new key compromise impersonation attack, where an adversary is allowed to reveal both the shared static secret key between two-party participation and the ephemeral private key of the initiator party in order to mount this attack. In addition, we present a new security model that covers these attacks against an extremely strong adversary. Moreover, we propose an improved YAK protocol to remedy these attacks and the previous attacks mentioned by Toorani on the YAK protocol, and the proposed protocol uses a verification mechanism in its block design that provides entity authentication and key confirmation. Meanwhile, we show that the proposed protocol is secure in the proposed formal security model under the gap Diffie-Hellman assumption and the random oracle assumption. Moreover, we verify the security of the proposed protocol and YAK protocol by using an automatic verification method such as the Scyther tool, and the verification result shows that the security claims of the proposed protocol are proven, in contrast to those of the YAK protocol, which are not proven. The security and performance comparisons show that the improved YAK protocol outperforms previous related protocols. K E Y W O R D Sauthenticated key agreement, cryptanalysis, eCK, formal security model, key compromise impersonation, known key security, Scyther tool | INTRODUCTIONAs a result of the rapid development in the Internet of Things (IoT)-related applications in daily life, which uses diverse communication devices, securing data has become a more challenging task. Due to a diverse powerful adversary for revealing secret information from a party's participation via the open communication model, many formal security models and automated verification tools have been developed for finding security flaws in proposed new protocols before implementing them in applications. Consequently, secret key distribution and user authentication became the most important security issues in IoT. Nowadays, the security proof and verification process of an Authenticated Key Agreement (AKA) protocol in the formal security model is important for successful IoT applications.Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol is a fundamental building block to distribute a shared secret key over an insecure communication model, 1 which is based on the concept of asymmetric cryptography. The shared secret key is used to provide confidentiality, integrity, nonrepudiation, and authenticity for data during transmission over an untrusted communication model. An AKA protocol is based on a public key, wherein the two intended participating parties exchange static and ephemeral ...

show abstract

On the Resilience of Key Agreement Protocols to Key Compromise Impersonation

Cited by 29 publications

References 16 publications

On the Security of Three Versions of the WAI Protocol in Chinese WLAN Implementation Plan

On the Security of Three Versions of the WAI Protocol in Chinese WLAN Implementation Plan

On the security of certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol

Cryptanalysis and improvement of the YAK protocol with formal security proof and security verification via Scyther

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About