On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations

Fairness and Transparency in One-to-Many Bargaining with Complementarity: An Experimental Study

“…Note also that our research objective regarding information transparency is different in nature from previous theoretical analysis of confidentiality/transparency in one-to-many bargaining, such as [41,[43][44][45]65]. These works typically examine transparency in a payoff-relevant asymmetric information framework rather than with a focus on direct social comparison.…”

“…Earlier theoretical treatment of one-to-many bargaining typically assumed an exogenous ordering protocol [37][38][39][40]. Subsequently, [41][42][43][44][45] study endogenous sequencing in one-buyer-multiple-seller bargaining where the buyer interacts with each seller only once. A number of recent studies look at endogenous order of bargaining between one buyer and multiple heterogeneous sellers in a sequential context involving potentially repeating offers and counteroffers.…”

On the Role of Confidentiality and Deadlines in Bilateral Negotiations

“…Comparing (3) with (1), it is evident that seller j in the downstream prices less aggressively under open-ended offers to accommodate i's offer; and anticipating this behavior, seller i demands a higher price than he does under exploding offers, i.e., P O (s i ) > P X (s i ). 13 It is also worth remarking that unlike with exploding offers, the buyer never receives a negative ex post payoff with open-ended offers.…”

Payoff uncertainty, bargaining power, and the strategic sequencing of bilateral negotiations

“…Our article is also related to Krasteva and Yildirim (2012) and Noe and Wang (2004), who each compare the outcomes of publicly and confidentially conducted bilateral negotiations by assuming no payoff uncertainty. These authors also discover that the buyer is indifferent to the sequence under both types of negotiations, though she may strictly randomize over the sequence under confidentiality and pay‐as‐you‐go schemes.…”