2012
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00184.x
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Payoff uncertainty, bargaining power, and the strategic sequencing of bilateral negotiations

Abstract: This article investigates the sequencing choice of a buyer who negotiates with the sellers of two complementary objects with uncertain payoffs. The possibility of inefficient trade may generate strict sequencing preference. The buyer begins with the weaker seller if the sellers have diverse bargaining powers and with the stronger one if both sellers are strong bargainers. This sequencing is likely to increase the social surplus. Moreover, the buyer may find it optimal to raise her own acquisition cost by commi… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
7
0
1

Year Published

2013
2013
2021
2021

Publication Types

Select...
8
1

Relationship

0
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 26 publications
(8 citation statements)
references
References 32 publications
0
7
0
1
Order By: Relevance
“…Therefore, compelling approach in selling the product may hinder an entrant in building strong relationships with its customers. Alternatively, to realize the first-mover advantage, an entrant may use his/her soft power while setting up prices with a strong complementarity between product offerings (Krasteva & Yildirim, 2012). Therefore, complementor relationship management becomes critical as suggested by Hamilton and Srivastava (2008), and Reiss (2010) not only to build trust but also to create a healthy relationship, and selling is a relationship management (Reilly, 2010).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Therefore, compelling approach in selling the product may hinder an entrant in building strong relationships with its customers. Alternatively, to realize the first-mover advantage, an entrant may use his/her soft power while setting up prices with a strong complementarity between product offerings (Krasteva & Yildirim, 2012). Therefore, complementor relationship management becomes critical as suggested by Hamilton and Srivastava (2008), and Reiss (2010) not only to build trust but also to create a healthy relationship, and selling is a relationship management (Reilly, 2010).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our results on strategic sequencing of litigation targets are related to the literature on optimal negotiation sequence. Krasteva and Yildirim (), for instance, consider the sequencing choice of a buyer who negotiates with the sellers of two complementary objects with uncertain payoffs. They show that the buyer's optimal sequencing is to negotiate with the weak seller if the sellers have diverse bargaining powers.…”
Section: Strategic Litigation Target Choicementioning
confidence: 99%
“…La elección de la secuencia de un comprador que negocia con los vendedores de dos objetos complementarios trae beneficios inciertos, según Krasteva & Yildirim (2012). Una posibilidad es la generación de un comercio ineficiente supuesta una preferencia estricta de secuenciación.…”
Section: Comercio Intrafirma Y Comercio Internacionalunclassified