On the Social Nature of Personality: Effects of Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Feedback about Collective Resource Use on Cooperation in a Resource Dilemma

Abstract

The present research investigated how individual differences in Extraversion and Agreeableness affect cooperation in an experimental resource dilemma. Manipulated feedback indicated either that the common resource was being used at a sustainable rate or that it was being rapidly depleted. As predicted, Extraversion was generally negatively related to cooperation, whereas Agreeableness was generally positively related to cooperation. Whereas individuals high in Extraversion and individuals low in Agreeableness were unresponsive to feedback regarding collective resource use, individuals low in Extraversion and individuals high in Agreeableness exercised more self-restraint when the common resource was severely threatened. Exploratory analyses revealed neither interactive effects of Extraversion and Agreeableness nor effects of individual differences in Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Intellect. Together, these results highlight the importance of individual differences in Extraversion and Agreeableness in social dilemma settings.

Inheritance, Obligation, and Responsibility in a Commons Dilemma

“…These include, but are not limited to: personality (e.g., Koole, Jager, Vlek, & Hofstee, 2001;Smith & Bell, 1993);…”

“…In regard to conditions under which individuals believe that previous harvesters have behaved in an exploitive manner, other past research suggests that when a resource is perceived to be dwindling individuals will compensate by conserving (e.g., Loomis et al, 1994;Koole, Jager, van den Berg, Vlek, & Hofstee, 2001). For example, Loomis and colleagues (1994) found that when groups of individuals harvested from a shared resource that began to reach very low levels, they reduced their harvesting to slow the depletion.…”

Interactions between personality and institutions in cooperative behaviour in humans

“…when players were informed that other players would be given the opportunity to fine them based on their contributions [28]. To further confuse matters, Koole et al [24] did not find a reliable effect of neuroticism on resource depletion in a collective resource dilemma, and Volk et al [23] did not find a robust relationship between neuroticism (emotional stability) and contributions in a one-shot PGG. Similarly, neither Zettler et al [39] nor Pothos et al [25] observed a robust effect of neuroticism or BIS on cooperation in a one-shot PD.…”

“…Indeed, individuals high in agreeableness were more likely to be conditional cooperators in a 'one-shot' PGG (i.e. only one round of the game is played) [23] and more likely to cooperate unconditionally in a commons dilemma when the resource was severely threatened [24]. They were also more likely to cooperate in a one-shot PD, but only when the payoff structure was such that cooperation, rather than defection, was the optimal strategy [25], and in the first round of an iterated PD (IPD; i.e.…”

“…However, they were not used by Hilbig et al [28] in one-shot PGG without and with punishment nor by Pothos et al [25], Hirsh & Peterson [29] or Zettler et al [39] in the PD. Boone et al [32] and Koole et al [24] motivated players with prizes awarded to a few participants with the highest payoffs in PD and commons resource games, respectively (Koole et al [24] used a lottery, with odds determined by points accumulated in the commons game), but players could not attach an exact monetary value to the decisions with which they were faced.…”