On the source, site and modes of domination

Blunt, Gwilym David

doi:10.1080/2158379x.2015.1010800

Cited by 34 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Blunt argues in this regard that the normative essence of arbitrary power becomes evident when a person is affected by power over which she has no control (Blunt 2015). That is to say that if specific institutionalized structures eliminate all elements of reciprocity, we may indeed conclude that they make domination possible insofar as the person interfered with has no opportunity to raise her concerns prior to a given decision being taken, has no access to the procedures and deliberations of decision making, and has no recourse to redress concerning decisions and their implementation.…”

Section: Power Domination and Space(s)mentioning

confidence: 99%

A theoretical framework for analyzing institutionalized domination in network governance arrangements

Larsson

2017

Critical Policy Studies

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Network governance, which involves an informal and self-regulated set of public and private actors who together address various political and social problems, has substantially altered the institutional landscape concerning the formation and implementation of public policy. A common view is that this has made it possible to enhance pluralism and disperse political power by transferring power from the sovereign state to a wider set of private actors and stakeholders. I argue in this article that we need to analyze network governance in reference to the concept of domination and the theoretical tradition of neorepublicanism. For this purpose, I develop a theoretical framework that specifies five dimensions in which domination may arise and, conversely, be mitigated. An alternative image of network governance emerges which reveals that this type of governance may in fact generate a form of institutional domination that encompasses both citizens and civil society actors due to the arbitrary influence that certain network participants come to exercise upon the life choices of non-participants.Acknowledgments: An early version of this article was presented at the Seminar for Public Policy and Administration, Department of Government, Uppsala University. The author is grateful for the comments of the seminar participants as well as those of colleagues who read and discussed the text during the working process. A special thanks is extended to Andrew Blasko for his proofreading of the manuscript. The author also wishes to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful remarks that helped improve the article as a whole, including its core arguments.

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Section: Power Domination and Space(s)mentioning

confidence: 99%

A theoretical framework for analyzing institutionalized domination in network governance arrangements

Larsson

2017

Critical Policy Studies

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“…This accords with how domination has been conceptualised by republicans (Lovett and Pettit, 2009: 12; Skinner, 2008: 85). It also seems to accord with the condition of the slave, which is used as the paradigmatic example of domination (Blunt, 2015: 6). The slave is in a condition where all their choices are the pleasure of their master.…”

Section: Republicanismmentioning

confidence: 98%

The case for epistocratic republicanism

Blunt

2019

Politics

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In recent years, the fortunes of democracy have waned both in theory and practice. This has added impetus not only to the republican case for strengthening democratic institutions but also to new anti-democratic thought. This article examines the claim made by Jason Brennan that epistocracy, rule by the ‘knowledgeable’, is compatible with freedom from domination. It begins by briefly explaining epistocracy and republicanism. It then presents the argument for epistocratic republicanism: that democracy can be a source of domination and that freedom from domination can be secured through non-democratic political institutions. The case against epistocratic republicanism is grounded in concerns about systemic domination and the ability of epistocrats to arbitrarily set the terms of social cooperation. These two arguments are judged on the basis of which better minimises domination while respecting its value to all people. Epistocratic republicanism is found to be less reliable because of the risks of epistemic injustice that accompanies systemic domination; democracy, accompanied by other republican institutions, is better at minimising domination and respecting persons. It concludes that republicans ought to be democrats.

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“…Domination can be understood in the following terms: a social relationship or institution is dominating if X, an agent, possesses the capacity to arbitrarily interfere in the choices available to Y, a dependent agent (Pettit 1997, 52, 2008, 102–10; Skinner 2008, 84–85; Lovett 2010, 119; Blunt 2015, 5). Domination has two different socially constituted modes: interactional and systemic.…”

Section: Slavery Apartheid and Global Povertymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The interactional mode applies to relationships where an individual has arbitrary power over another person. The systemic mode applies to relationships and institutions in which the status of a person is arbitrarily determined and incontestable, though the individual might not be subjected to interactional domination (Blunt 2015, 12–19). Domination is considered especially abhorrent because it dehumanizes the subject by stripping him or her of minimal autonomy, understood as the ability to choose and pursue their own conception of a good life (Pettit 1997, 90–92; Laborde 2010, 54–55; Lovett 2010, 130–31).…”

Section: Slavery Apartheid and Global Povertymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Slavery is often held up as the archetypical example of domination, insofar as the slave–owner has a nearly unlimited capacity to interfere in the choices available to the slave (Pettit 1997, 31–35; Lovett and Pettit 2009, 14; Lovett 2010, 154–56; Blunt 2015, 6–7). The person who is caught in a contemporary form of slavery is in a similar relationship with their master as the chattel slave is with his.…”

Section: Slavery Apartheid and Global Povertymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Is global poverty a crime against humanity?

Blunt

2015

Int. Theory

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Pogge has repeatedly compared the causes of global poverty with historical crimes against humanity. This claim, however, has been treated as mere rhetoric. This article argues that there are good reasons to take it seriously. It does this by comparing Pogge's thesis on the causes of global poverty with the baseline definition of crimes against humanity found in international law, especially the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. It argues that the causes of global poverty are comparable with the crimes of slavery and apartheid. This has important consequences for cosmopolitan thought, as it makes the need for practical solutions to global poverty more urgent and raises questions about the global poor's right to resist the international system by violent means.

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On the source, site and modes of domination

Cited by 34 publications

References 18 publications

A theoretical framework for analyzing institutionalized domination in network governance arrangements

A theoretical framework for analyzing institutionalized domination in network governance arrangements

The case for epistocratic republicanism

Is global poverty a crime against humanity?

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