This article seeks to examine how domination manifests in social relationships and institutions. It does this by examining two debates in republican literature. The first of which is whether domination requires institutionalisation? This addresses the source of domination. The second debate is on the nature of arbitrary power. This raises questions about the site of domination. It will be argued that the source of domination can be personally or socially constituted and that the site can be interactional or systemic. This yields four modes of domination that can be used to examine social institutions and relationships.

Pogge has repeatedly compared the causes of global poverty with historical crimes against humanity. This claim, however, has been treated as mere rhetoric. This article argues that there are good reasons to take it seriously. It does this by comparing Pogge's thesis on the causes of global poverty with the baseline definition of crimes against humanity found in international law, especially the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. It argues that the causes of global poverty are comparable with the crimes of slavery and apartheid. This has important consequences for cosmopolitan thought, as it makes the need for practical solutions to global poverty more urgent and raises questions about the global poor's right to resist the international system by violent means.

The turn of the twenty-first century witnessed a revival of interest in the role of philanthropy in the international system, especially in the fields of global poverty and health. Yet, despite an emergent critical literature in development studies and international studies, philanthropy has barely featured in the debate on global distributive justice. This article uses the republican conception of domination as an analytical framework to precisely articulate concerns of justice raised by transnational philanthropy. Using the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and its role in global health as a test case, it argues that transnational philanthropy is characterized by an asymmetric distribution of power, which is sufficient to produce dependence, and that is uncontrolled insofar as its use either rests on the will of powerful agents or on terms of social cooperation beyond contestation. This arbitrary character is particularly relevant to philanthropy because of its use of epistemic power to produce and legitimize knowledge. In short, transnational philanthropy is dominating. If individuals have the right to exercise control over the social institutions that profoundly affect their basic interests, then philanthropy has a problem of justice that cannot be dismissed.

This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version.Permanent repository link: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/20220/ Link to published version: http://dx.

Illegal economic immigrants have become a bête noir in the affluent states of the Global North. They have been portrayed as threats to wealth and stability; they are "anonymous and out of place, homeless and bereft of clear national belonging." 1 It is easy to imagine that many people share David Miller's reaction of sympathy and outrage at impoverished persons illegally crossing borders. He asked incredulously whether the migrants thought they had a "natural right to enter Spain in defiance of the laws that apply to everyone else who might want to move there?" 2 This article asks how cosmopolitans should assess the actions of illegal immigrants. It argues that immigrants who suffer from severe poverty do, indeed, have a right to enter Global North, even if they are not legally permitted to do so. 3 This argument is not derived from a right to freedom of movement that other cosmopolitans have advocated. 4 Instead, this is an instance of people enacting their right to resistance by escaping to the North; it is comparable to fugitive slaves in the antebellum United States. Both cases are examples of infrapolitical resistance by severely dominated agents. Some readers may be surprised and potentially upset by the terminology employed in this article. The use of 'illegal immigration' is deliberate and, indeed, provocative. It is understandable that certain stakeholders prefer such adjectives as 'undocumented' or 'irregular' and the general noun 'migrant' instead of 'immigrant'. 5 However, there are no neutral terms in this debate and, by avoiding a politically toxic term like 'illegal immigrant', an important question about the morality of breaking the law is obscured. It concedes the point that breaking the law by clandestinely crossing borders is something shameful. It becomes unmentionable. This article will argue that it is not in the case of severely poor immigrants and aims to reclaim this term.