2016
DOI: 10.1098/rspa.2016.0295
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On the use of Bayesian decision theory for issuing natural hazard warnings

Abstract: Warnings for natural hazards improve societal resilience and are a good example of decision-making under uncertainty. A warning system is only useful if well defined and thus understood by stakeholders. However, most operational warning systems are heuristic: not formally or transparently defined. Bayesian decision theory provides a framework for issuing warnings under uncertainty but has not been fully exploited. Here, a decision theoretic framework is proposed for hazard warnings. The framework allows any nu… Show more

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Cited by 32 publications
(33 citation statements)
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“…Therefore, this general method can greatly help warning analysts in surveillance systems to making well‐informed decisions. Furthermore, the availability of samples from the predictive distribution of the counts implies that the predictions from the proposed models can be readily utilised in a decision theoretic framework for issuing warnings (as in the work of Economou et al).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Therefore, this general method can greatly help warning analysts in surveillance systems to making well‐informed decisions. Furthermore, the availability of samples from the predictive distribution of the counts implies that the predictions from the proposed models can be readily utilised in a decision theoretic framework for issuing warnings (as in the work of Economou et al).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This asymmetry is all the more notable, if we take into account the considerable historical evidence that humans are more likely to fail to respond to warnings than we are to overreact to them (Mileti & Sorensen, ). Moreover, if the concern is how people will react to false alarms, research on people's reactions to weather forecasts suggests that people are more forgiving of false alarms than of failure to warn of major events (Economou et al, ). Without evidence that people react differently when it comes to climate events than to weather and other sorts of events, climate researchers are making a claim for which they lack evidence, and which available evidence suggests may not be the case.…”
Section: Arguments Against the Storyline Approachmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is crucial to the recognition that the interests of scientists in protecting their reputations may not be the same as the interest of citizens in protecting themselves. One recent study (Economou et al, ), for example, shows that the decision rule for issuing natural hazard warnings, such as weather warnings, can be customized to reflect the interests of different users. Crucially, this paper shows that considering the interest of the reputation of the forecaster leads to a different decision rule than would be appropriate for a member of society who wishes to be protected from an extreme weather event.…”
Section: What Is At Stake and Why It Mattersmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These losses could be individually specified by a risk manager, or using some low‐dimensional parametrization of the loss function (e.g. Economou et al , ). Many forms of loss exist, such as the loss of profit, loss due to regret, loss of reputation or loss of life, amongst others.…”
Section: Decision Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%