Only for my own neighborhood?

Blackwell, Calvin; McKee, Michael

doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(02)00178-6

Cited by 74 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Some classes of goods are globally public, and others are only locally public. Global public goods are available to the entire population (including those unable or unwilling to contribute globally) while local public goods may be available only to the residents of a very small neighborhood or a specific population community [65]. The construction of a dam is a typical example of global public goods.…”

Section: J Stat Mech (2018) 013403mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evolution of global contribution in multi-level threshold public goods games with insurance compensation

Tang

2018

J. Stat. Mech.

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Abstract. Understanding voluntary contribution in threshold public goods games has important practical implications. To improve contributions and provision frequency, free-rider problem and assurance problem should be solved. Insurance could play a significant, but largely unrecognized, role in facilitating a contribution to provision of public goods through providing insurance compensation against the losses. In this paper, we study how insurance compensation mechanism aects individuals' decision-making under risk environments. We propose a multi-level threshold public goods game model where two kinds of public goods games (local and global) are considered. Particularly, the global public goods game involves a threshold, which is related to the safety of all the players. We theoretically probe the evolution of contributions of dierent levels and free-riders, and focus on the influence of the insurance on the global contribution. We explore, in both the cases, the scenarios that only global contributors could buy insurance and all the players could. It is found that with greater insurance compensation, especially under high collective risks, players are more likely to contribute globally when PAPER: Interdisciplinary statistical mechanics

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Section: J Stat Mech (2018) 013403mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hence, individuals are simultaneously involved in multi-level PGGs (MPGG) on dierent hierarchical levels [99]. There exist experimental studies on MPGG [52,65,100], however, the theoretical discussion has seldom provided clear answers to the question of the relative propensity to give to the local or global public good.…”

Section: J Stat Mech (2018) 013403mentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution of global contribution in multi-level threshold public goods games with insurance compensation

Tang

2018

J. Stat. Mech.

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“…Owing to geographic space, some classes of goods are globally public, and others are only locally public. Global public goods are available to the entire population while local public goods may be available only to the residents of a very small neighborhood [32,33]. Thus, players in the model can choose among selfishness, contributing to global public goods, or local public goods.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution of Global Cooperation in Multi-Level Threshold Public Goods Games With Income Redistribution

Wang

2018

Front. Phys.

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“…Each individual engages in not only the "local" PGG in its community, but also the "global" PGG played among distinct communities. Hence, individuals are simultaneously involved in multiple PGGs on different hierarchical levels [17][18][19]. These simultaneous local and global PGGs in a community-structured population constitute a multilevel PGG (MPGG).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…periments [17][18][19] and simulation [20]. Some theoretical models are proposed to study the cooperation and punishment in infinite group-structured populations by deterministic analysis [21].…”

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confidence: 99%

Evolution of cooperation in multilevel public goods games with community structures

Wang¹,

Wu²,

Ho³

et al. 2011

EPL

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Abstract. -In a community-structured population, public goods games (PGG) occur both within and between communities. Such type of PGG is referred as multilevel public goods games (MPGG). We propose a minimalist evolutionary model of the MPGG and analytically study the evolution of cooperation. We demonstrate that in the case of sufficiently large community size and community number, if the imitation strength within community is weak, i.e., an individual imitates another one in the same community almost randomly, cooperation as well as punishment are more abundant than defection in the long run; if the imitation strength between communities is strong, i.e., the more successful strategy in two individuals from distinct communities is always imitated, cooperation and punishment are also more abundant. However, when both of the two imitation intensities are strong, defection becomes the most abundant strategy in the population. Our model provides insight into the investigation of the large-scale cooperation in public social dilemma among contemporary communities.

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Only for my own neighborhood?

Cited by 74 publications

References 20 publications

Evolution of global contribution in multi-level threshold public goods games with insurance compensation

Evolution of global contribution in multi-level threshold public goods games with insurance compensation

Evolution of Global Cooperation in Multi-Level Threshold Public Goods Games With Income Redistribution

Evolution of cooperation in multilevel public goods games with community structures

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