Ontic Structural Realism as a Metaphysics of Objects

Abstract

The paper spells out five different accounts of the relationship between objects and relations three of which are versions of ontic structural realism (OSR). We argue that the distinction between objects and properties, including relations, is merely a conceptual one by contrast to an ontological one: properties, including relations, are modes, that is the concrete, particular ways in which objects exist. We then set out moderate OSR as the view according to which irreducible relations are central ways in which the fundamental physical objects exist. Physical structures thus consist in objects for whom it is essential that they are related in certain ways. There hence are objects, but they do not possess an intrinsic identity. This view can also admit intrinsic properties as ways in which objects exist provided that these do not amount to identity conditions for the objects. Finally, we indicate how this view can take objective modality into account. IntroductionIn a first approach, ontic structural realism (OSR) is a realism towards physical structures in the sense of networks of concrete physical relations, without these relations being dependent on fundamental physical objects that possess an intrinsic identity as their relata. In that vein, OSR has been developed in recent years as a metaphysics of contemporary fundamental physics, mainly non-relativistic quantum mechanics (QM), relativistic quantum field theory (QFT) and the general theory of relativity (GTR) shown to support OSR in the following sense: these fundamental physical features can with good reason be taken to suggest all the same conclusion, namely that the fundamental physical objects -whatever they are according to the theory under consideration -are parts (relata) of a physical structure in the sense of a network of concrete physical relations. These objects do not have any existence -and in particular not any identity -independently of the structure they are part of (that is, the relations they bear to each other)..To be more precise, the original papers on OSR -mainly Ladyman (1998) and French and Ladyman (2003) -consider OSR to be supported by a fundamental underdetermination about 1 We are greatful to Tim Raez, Jakob Sprickerhof and Christian Wüthrich for helpful comments on the draft of this paper.

Priority and Particle Physics: Ontic Structural Realism as a Fundamentality Thesis

“…And the relevant states in the case of fermions -which we regard as the fundamental constituents of matter -are of the 45 Ibid., p. 145. 46 Esfeld and Lam [2010], p. 148. 47 See Saunders op.…”

Structuralism with and without causation

“…9 If these laws have a causal interpretation, then OSR could be thought to converge with Causal Structuralism. Indeed, as already mentioned, OSR has been given a causal spin by some of its more recent advocates, who effectively aim to converge the two structuralist lines of thought (Esfeld 2009;Esfeld and Lam 2008;Esfeld 2010;Esfeld and Lam 2011). The convergence is motivated on various grounds, with the claimed benefit, for example, of being able to account for the modal nature of physical struc-6 Cf.…”

Structural Invariants, Structural Kinds, Structural Laws

“…Chakravartty 2007). The perhaps most outspoken proponent of this movement is Michael Esfeld (2009, Esfeld and Lam 2011. As he sees things, "the fundamental physical structures possess a causal essence, being powers" (Esfeld 2009).…”