Opaque transparency: an analysis of the Israeli lobbying regulatory regime of 2008

Abstract

After some failed attempts to regulate the lobbying, the Israeli Parliament—the Knesset—passed the Lobbyist Law on April 2nd 2008. Although lobbying is a common and legitimate part of the democratic process, it raises issues of trust, equality of access, and transparency. What motivated the MKs to regulate lobbying—public interest, private interest, or symbolic politics? The MKs claimed that the law was needed for improving transparency whereas MK Yechimovich declared that it balances the strength of the rich, represented by lobbyists and the wide public. Assessing the achieved transparency in the comparative framework of other lobbying regulatory regimes, we see that the law confers tangible benefits on powerful interest groups, while providing only symbolic gestures to the public. Lack of information available for MKs creates a need for lobbyists for political intelligence and MKs need to identify the interests in play to guarantee for themselves the necessary legislative subsidy. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Diluted regulations—a need to review the theoretical classification of the different lobbying regulatory environments

“…These desperate steps were late, as they were taken almost 4 years after that the Knesset had passed a weak Lobbyist Law, scoring only 22 points according to the CPI score (Veksler : 274–275). These steps—although presented as a solution for problem—did not create more transparency but only set certain restrictions on the lobbyists' movements in the Knesset building and curbed lobbyists' access to certain areas.…”

“…Lobbyists described the situation in Israel before the law as follows: (1) bordering anarchy in the field of lobbying—the MKs could not identify the lobbyists or the interests in the play, because they couldn't know whether 'A' was still a TV reporter or now a lobbyist, or whether 'B' was Kadima party's chief of staff or a lobbyist; (2) the freelance lobbyists and lobbying companies used a brutal overkill method in convincing the MKs; (3) the party centre members turned the Knesset into a Middle‐Eastern bazaar with their barbarous behaviour—MKs felt uncomfortable with their former campaign assistants shouting in the Knesset cafeteria and inviting them to their tables to solve their clan problems. (Veksler, : 39).…”

“…After the law passed, MK Solodkin complained that the lobbying phenomenon is threatening the independence of the MKs, and the amount of lobbyists swarming in the Knesset is frightening. MK Solodkin claimed that the outcome is worse than before the law (Veksler, : 62).…”

“…Veksler (: 55) analysed Israeli regulatory regime in the framework created by Chari et al . () and placed it between the categories of lowly and medium regulated systems: no spending disclosures are required like in lowly regulated systems, whereas lobbyists must reveal their employers, which is a characteristic to the medium regulated systems.…”

“…Veksler (: 275–276) observed these and other unexpected benefits in Israel as the Lobbyist Law resulted in great advantages for the lobbyists. All the interviewed lobbyists stated that the situation has changed for them in a surprising way—lobbyists are now officially recognised as a legitimate profession by the Knesset, they are registered and their entrance permits are secured.…”