Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining

Stasavage, David

doi:10.1017/s0020818304040214

Cited by 248 publications

(161 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…While public opinion is generally seen as an important factor explaining government behavior in the domestic context, the empirical literature on the role of public opinion in IOs is still sparse (see Stasavage 2004). Instead, studies of government behavior in IOs have mainly focused on other drivers, such as geopolitics, military and economic resources, and special interest preferences (see e.g.…”

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confidence: 99%

Government Responsiveness in the European Union: Evidence From Council Voting

Hagemann

Hobolt

Wratil

2016

Comparative Political Studies

126

142

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* * * * Are governments responsive to public preferences when legislating in international organizations? This paper demonstrates that governments respond to domestic public opinion even when acting at the international level. Specifically, we examine conflict in the European Union's primary legislative body, the Council of the European Union (EU). We argue that domestic electoral incentives compel governments to react to public opinion. Analyzing a unique dataset on all legislative decisions adopted in the Council since 1999, we show that governments are more likely to oppose legislative proposals that extend the level and scope of EU authority when their domestic electorates are skeptical about the EU. We also find that governments are more responsive when the issue of European integration is salient in domestic party politics. Our findings demonstrate that governments can use the international stage to signal their responsiveness to public concerns and that such signals resonate in the domestic political debate.Key words: responsiveness, legislative behavior, Council, public opinion, European Union * The order of authors is determined alphabetically. The authors gratefully acknowledge funding from TheLeverhulme Trust (RF-2013-345) Our findings demonstrate that governments' opposition to legislative proposals is indeed shaped by public opinion on European integration wherever these proposals extend the level and scope of European integration. We also find that governments are more likely to signal their positions in the Council when the issue gains importance in domestic party competition and that these signals resonate in the national public sphere. Our findings thus contribute not only to our understanding of policy-making in the EU, but may also have broader significance as IOs increasingly face pressures to deepen cooperation and increase transparency and accountability to domestic audiences. Moreover, our study enhances our understanding of democratic responsiveness by highlighting that governments use the international stage to signal to voters at home that they care about their views. Government Responsiveness in International OrganizationsThe relationship between public preferences and government policy is at the heart of theories of Hence, as there are few benefits (the policy will be passed by the majority in any case) and several costs, it is not surprising that opposition is still relative rare, accounting for less than 2 H1: Governments are more likely to oppose legislative proposals that affect the authority of the EU when domestic public opinion is negatively disposed towards the EU than when public opinion is positively disposed towards the EU.The extent to which governments wish to use opposition votes as a signal to their publics is also shaped by domestic political competition. We expect that governments' responsiveness is higher when the issue of European integration is salient in the domestic context. Since signal responsiveness aims at communicating positions (and shifts in pos...

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confidence: 99%

Government Responsiveness in the European Union: Evidence From Council Voting

Hagemann

Hobolt

Wratil

2016

Comparative Political Studies

126

142

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“…High levels of transparency in legislative politics are found to improve the relationship between citizens and elected politicians in a number of ways: Better access to information forces politicians to be responsive to their electorates (Alt & Lassen, 2006;Besley and Burgess, 2002;Stasavage, 2004), while voters are also more likely to engage and vote in elections when they feel they can hold politicians to account (Lassen, 2005).…”

Section: Transparency and Its Consequencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Adding to this literature, Stasavage (2004) investigates the implications of increased transparency in international organisations, and looks into the consequences of public scrutiny of decision-making in the EU Council; i.e. the same institution as in our analysis below.…”

Section: Transparency and Its Consequencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Besley and Prat, 2006;Fox, 2007;Meade and Stasavage, 2008;Naurin, 2007;Prat, 2005;Stasavage, 2004Stasavage, , 2007. We argue against this conclusion by presenting a model of government bargaining in the Council of the European Union (hereafter 'the Council'), as well as empirical results from a dataset on Council decision-making from 1999 to 2014.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Transparency vs efficiency? A study of negotiations in the Council of the European Union

Hagemann

Franchino

2016

European Union Politics

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Recent studies suggest there is a direct trade-off between transparency and efficiency in legislative politics. We challenge this conclusion and present a bargaining model where one particular kind of transparency -the publication of legislative records -works to overcome problems of incomplete information. We also present empirical findings from legislative activities in the Council of the European Union from 1999 to 2014, and from 23 interviews with senior officials in Brussels. Our results show that increased transparency, in the form of publication of legislative records, does not lead to gridlock or prolonged negotiations. On the contrary, recordings of governments' positions help facilitate decision-making as it increases credibility of policy positions. This, in turn, lowers risk of negotiation failure and screens out marginal amendments.

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“…Previous studies have noted that states prefer to close negotiations when the issues under discussion are sensitive (Depledge 2005;Raustiala 1997;Stasavage 2004). This paper, however, argues that the sensitivity explanation alone does not adequately explain the dynamics of closing negotiations to observers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Open or closed meetings? Explaining nonstate actor involvement in the international climate change negotiations

Nasiritousi

Linnér

2014

Int Environ Agreements

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When do states allow nonstate actors (NSAs) to observe negotiations at intergovernmental meetings? Previous studies have identified the need for states to close negotiations when the issues under discussion are sensitive. This paper argues that sensitivity alone cannot adequately explain the dynamic of closing down negotiations to observers. Questions that have received little attention in the literature include which issues are considered sensitive and how the decision is made to move the negotiations behind closed doors. This paper examines the practices of NSA involvement in climate diplomacy from three analytical perspectives: functional efficiency, political dynamics, and historical institutionalism. Based on interviews and UNFCCC documents, this paper suggests that to understand the issue of openness in negotiations, institutional factors and the politics of NSA involvement need to be better scrutinized. The paper shows that each perspective has particular advantages when analyzing different dimensions of the negotiations, with implications of how we understand the role of NSAs in global environmental governance.

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Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining

Cited by 248 publications

References 35 publications

Government Responsiveness in the European Union: Evidence From Council Voting

Government Responsiveness in the European Union: Evidence From Council Voting

Transparency vs efficiency? A study of negotiations in the Council of the European Union

Open or closed meetings? Explaining nonstate actor involvement in the international climate change negotiations

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