Operational Vulnerability Identification Procedure for Nuclear Facilities Using STAMP/STPA

Lee, Sang Hun; Shin, Seong‐Ho; Hwang, Jeong Sik; Park, Jinkyun

doi:10.1109/access.2020.3021741

Cited by 15 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…Identifying UCAs involves recognizing control actions that could lead to hazards and potential accidents in the PSD system. A UCA is an unsafe action, so it is critical to identify and ensure the safe and reliable operation of complex systems [10]. There are four types of control actions that can be unsafe.…”

Section: Identification Of Unsafe Control Actionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The key activity of STPA is identifying loss scenarios, which explain unsafe control measures and possible causes of risk [9]. STPA has the advantage of improving the overall safety and reliability of the system by proactively identifying system vulnerabilities and preventing safety accidents [10]. A human safety analyst's trial-and-error approach to examining combinations of risk variables by hand, especially for highly complex systems, becomes impractical [11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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STPA-RL: Integrating Reinforcement Learning into STPA for Loss Scenario Exploration

Chang,

Kwon,

Kwon

2024

Applied Sciences

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Experience-based methods like reinforcement learning (RL) are often deemed less suitable for the safety field due to concerns about potential safety issues. To bridge this gap, we introduce STPA-RL, a methodology that integrates RL with System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA). STPA is a safety analysis technique that identifies causative factors leading to unsafe control actions and system hazards through loss scenarios. In the context of STPA-RL, we formalize the Markov Decision Process based on STPA analysis results to incorporate control algorithms into the system environment. The agent learns safe actions through reward-based learning, tracking potential hazard paths to validate system safety. Specifically, by analyzing various loss scenarios related to the Platform Screen Door, we assess the applicability of the proposed approach by evaluating hazard trajectory graphs and hazard frequencies in the system. This paper streamlines the RL process for loss scenario identification through STPA, contributing to self-guided loss scenarios and diverse system modeling. Additionally, it offers effective simulations for proactive development to enhance system safety and provide practical assistance in the safety field.

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Section: Identification Of Unsafe Control Actionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

STPA-RL: Integrating Reinforcement Learning into STPA for Loss Scenario Exploration

Chang,

Kwon,

Kwon

2024

Applied Sciences

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“…In [23] the authors developed a CAST analysis to describe the International Space Station EVA 23 water intrusion incident in order to explore complex interconnections, and real-time flight organizational operations, pairing VOLUME 11, 2023 it to safety recommendations. Other exemplary domains of application comprehend: the healthcare services [24], the automotive industry [25], the transportation systems [26], the nuclear energy generation [27], and the process industry [28], among others.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Thinking in Systems, Sifting Through Simulations: A Way Ahead for Cyber Resilience Assessment

et al. 2023

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The interaction between the physical world and information technologies creates advantages and novel emerging threats. Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) result vulnerable to cyber-related disruptive scenarios, and, for some critical systems, cyber failures may have fallouts on society and environment. Traditional risk analysis in no more sufficient to deal with these problems. New techniques are gaining increasing consensus, especially those based on systems theory. In this context, the System-Theoretic Process Analysis for Security (STPA-Sec) extends the Systems-Theoretic Accident Modelling and Processes (STAMP) model considering cyber threats, and identifying unsafe and unsecure controls throughout a cyber socio-technical system. Despite its large usage as a descriptive tool, there is still limited use of STPA-Sec in (semi-)quantitative terms. This article presents System-Theoretic Process Analysis for Security with Simulations (STPA-Sec/S), a methodological interface between STPA-Sec and quantitative resilience assessment based on simulation models. The methodology is instantiated in a demonstrative case study of a water treatment plant, and its critical CPSs which may impact both community health, and environment. The obtained results show how STPA-Sec/S foster systems understanding, allow a systematic identification of its major criticalities, and the respective quantification.INDEX TERMS Cyber security, cyber-socio-technical systems, hazard analysis, industrial systems engineering, resilience management, systems modeling.Open Access funding provided by 'Università degli Studi di Roma ''La Sapienza''' within the CRUI CARE Agreement

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“…Considering system and control theories, Leveson proposed the System-Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP) in 2004, using control theory to address the safety problem, and is regarded as the emergence of a model complex system [12][13][14][15][16]. System safety can be assessed by the imposition of constraints on the interactions of components.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Safety Assessment of Transport Aircraft Heavy Equipment Airdrop: An Improved STPA-BN Mechanism

Tian

Kan

et al. 2022

IEEE Access

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Aviation safety has been an eternal theme, and safety assessment is taken as the important method to assess the aircraft safety, but it is difficult to assess the safety of a heavy equipment airdrop from a transport aircraft due to mission complexity and strong coupling. This study uses an improved STPA-BN methodology to assess the safety of transport aircraft heavy equipment airdrop. To this purpose, qualitative safety analysis is performed by STPA, and then quantitative safety assessment is performed by BN. In contrast to the-state-of-the-art, the distinguishing feature of the proposed design lies in the introduction of DS evidence theory, which makes the probability of nodes in BN a priori. More precisely, best-worst multicriteria decision-making method (BWM) is skillfully incorporated into the DS evidence theory so as to tackle the conflict issue that exists in most existing designs. Importance analysis is utilized to determine the importance of the different risk nodes. A case of transport aircraft heavy equipment airdrop mission is used to test the effectiveness of the proposed method.INDEX TERMS Heavy equipment airdrop, STPA-BN, BWM, Safety assessment.

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Operational Vulnerability Identification Procedure for Nuclear Facilities Using STAMP/STPA

Cited by 15 publications

References 28 publications

STPA-RL: Integrating Reinforcement Learning into STPA for Loss Scenario Exploration

STPA-RL: Integrating Reinforcement Learning into STPA for Loss Scenario Exploration

Thinking in Systems, Sifting Through Simulations: A Way Ahead for Cyber Resilience Assessment

Safety Assessment of Transport Aircraft Heavy Equipment Airdrop: An Improved STPA-BN Mechanism

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