Optimal bid disclosure in patent license auctions under alternative modes of competition

Fan, Cuihong; Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar

doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.03.001

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 20 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…10 I mention only few examples. Information disclosure about bids matters in Lebrun (2010) because bidders can engage in resale after the auction; in Giovannoni and Makris (2014) because bidders have reputational concerns; and in Fan et al (2016) because bidders engage in oligopolistic competition after a cost-reducing patent has been auctioned to one of them.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions

Azacis

2020

Int J Game Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

I study sequential first-price auctions where two items are sold to two bidders with private binary valuations. A seller, prior to the second auction, can publicly disclose some information about the outcome of the first auction. I characterize equilibrium strategies for various disclosure rules when the valuations of bidders are either perfectly positively or perfectly negatively correlated across items. I establish outcome equivalence between different disclosure rules. I find that it is optimal for the seller to disclose some information when the valuations are negatively correlated, whereas it is optimal not to disclose any information when the valuations are positively correlated. For most of the parameter values, the seller's expected revenue is higher if the losing bid is disclosed. When only the winner's identity is disclosed, the equilibrium is efficient whether the valuations are positively or negatively correlated.

show abstract

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions

Azacis

2020

Int J Game Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…17-20 and Appendix III), Milgrom and Weber (1982), Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom, and Weber (1983), and Persico (2000. Among the more recent contributions we mention Kim (2008) and Jun, Wolfstetter, and Zamir (2020) who show, in different frameworks, how observing a rival bidder's valuation or signal may have negative value, and the analysis of bid disclosure in license auctions with downstream interaction by Fan, Jun, and Wolfstetter (2016) and in sequential first-price auctions by Bergemann and Hörner (2018).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Leaks in First-Price Auctions and Tacit Collusion: The Case of Spying and Counter-Spying

Fan

Jun²,

Wolfstetter

2021

SSRN Journal

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival's bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity about the type of spy gives rise to a non-standard signaling problem where both sender and receiver of messages have private information and the sender has a chance to make an unobserved move. Whereas spying without counterspy exclusively benefits the spying bidder, the potential presence of a counterspy yields a collusive outcome, even if the likelihood that the spy is a counterspy is arbitrarily small. That collusive impact shows up in all equilibria and is strongest in the unique pooling equilibrium which is also the payoff dominant equilibrium.

show abstract

“…55Auctions with different disclosure policies are also studied in, for example, Lebrun (2010), Fan et al (2016), Bergemann and Hörner (2018), and Azacis (2020). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Auctions with signaling concerns

Bos

Truyts

2020

Economics Manag Strategy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study a symmetric private value auction with signaling, in which the auction outcome is used by an outside observer to infer the bidders' types. We elicit conditions under which an essentially unique D1 equilibrium bidding function exists in the second‐price and the English auctions. We establish there is no equivalence between these two auction designs, neither in bidding strategies nor in expected revenue. This is because the presence or the absence of an increasing price clock affects signaling incentives differently in both auction formats, and thereby also the bidders' incentives to overbid their types. This leads to a strictly higher expected revenue in the second‐price auction than in the English auction. Our analysis is completed by a comparison with other disclosure policies. Applications include art auctions and charity auctions.

show abstract

Optimal bid disclosure in patent license auctions under alternative modes of competition

Cited by 8 publications

References 20 publications

Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions

Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions

Strategic Leaks in First-Price Auctions and Tacit Collusion: The Case of Spying and Counter-Spying

Auctions with signaling concerns

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About