Optimal design of exchange networks with blind inputs and its application to Eco-industrial parks

Abstract

Motivated by the design and optimization of the water exchange networks in Eco-Industrial Parks (EIP), we investigate the abstract Blind-Input model for general exchange networks. This abstract model is based on a Game Theory approach, formulating it as a Single-Leader-Multi-Follower (SLMF) game: at the upper level, there is an authority (leader) that aims to minimize the consumption of natural resources, while, at the lower level, agents (followers) try to minimize their operating costs. We introduce the notion of Blind-Input contract, which is an economic contract between the authority and the agents in order to ensure the participation of the latter ones in the exchange networks. More precisely, when participating in the exchange network, each agent accepts to have a blind input in the sense that she controls only her output fluxes, and the authority commits to guarantee a minimal relative improvement in comparison with the agent's stand-alone operation. The SLMF game is equivalently transformed into a single mixedinteger optimization problem. Thanks to this reformulation, examples of EIP of realistic size are then studied numerically.

Optimal design of exchange water networks with control inputs in Eco-Industrial Parks

“…Since these advantages depend on the EIP configuration, proper planning and design are critical. However, the system methods for designing the optimal configuration of EIP are lacking and the models of water exchange network used to model Eco-Industrial Parks in the literature are limited in some respects [21,8,10,19].…”

“…It is clear that the latter approach is more realistic in designing and optimizing the water exchange network in the EIP because first, it helps to reduce the overall freshwater consumption; second, it reduces the operating costs of each enterprise; third, enterprises operating in the EIP do not need to share their information with other enterprises of the park, which is clearly a very important issue in the design of an optimal EIP. The SLMF approach of the optimal design of EIP has been introduced for the first time in [19] and then specialized in [21,20]). In fact in [21], the authors have profoundly revisited the SLMF approach of [19] and have developed an abstract Blind-Input model for water exchange networks in EIPs.…”

“…The SLMF game is transformed into a single mixed-integer optimization problem. The obtained results are compared with the results of the blind-input model [21].…”

A MILP Model for Enhancing Wastewater Networks by Introducing Reclaimed Wastewater Usage

“…The recycle and reuse of wastewater has been widely studied during the last half century. Mathematical formulations for its intra-plant implementation are state-of-the-art (Karuppiah and Grossmann, 2006) and within the last two decades these models have been extended to consider exchanges in eco-industrial parks (Salas et al, 2020). Very recently, a study by Somoza-Tornos et al (2019) showed that also municipal WWTPs can generate benefit by targeting wastewater exchange in the context of circular economy.…”

Existence of solutions for deterministic bilevel games under a general Bayesian approach

“…The term Bilevel games is here used to refer to non-cooperative models ranging from bilevel programming problems [10] to multi-leader-follower games [12]. They have been used in recent years in multiple areas, such as electricity markets, toll pricing, industrial Eco-parks, [3,35,32,34]. For a nice survey on many other applications of bilevel programming, we refer the reader to [11].…”