Optimal impartial selection

Fischer, Felix; Klimm, Max

doi:10.1145/2600057.2602836

Cited by 30 publications

(56 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Given the set of submitted papers and reviewers, this graph is fixed and cannot be controlled. Note that the conflict graph C defined above can be viewed as a generalization of the authorship graph in the previously-studied settings (Merrifield and Saari, 2009;Alon et al, 2011;Holzman and Moulin, 2013;Fischer and Klimm, 2015;Kurokawa et al, 2015;Aziz et al, 2016;Kahng et al, 2017) of peer grading and grant proposal review, where each reviewer (paper) is connected to at most one paper (reviewer).…”

Section: Problem Settingmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Strategyproof Conference Peer Review

Han

Shi

et al. 2019

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

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We consider peer review in a conference setting where there is typically an overlap between the set of reviewers and the set of authors. This overlap can incentivize strategic reviews to influence the final ranking of one's own papers. In this work, we address this problem through the lens of social choice, and present a theoretical framework for strategyproof and efficient peer review. We first present and analyze an algorithm for reviewer-assignment and aggregation that guarantees strategyproofness and a natural efficiency property called unanimity, when the authorship graph satisfies a simple property. Our algorithm is based on the so-called partitioning method, and can be thought as a generalization of this method to conference peer review settings. We then empirically show that the requisite property on the authorship graph is indeed satisfied in the ICLR-17 submission data, and further demonstrate a simple trick to make the partitioning method more practically appealing for conference peer review. Finally, we complement our positive results with negative theoretical results where we prove that under various ways of strengthening the requirements, it is impossible for any algorithm to be strategyproof and efficient. * Equal contribution.

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Section: Problem Settingmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Strategyproof Conference Peer Review

Han

Shi

et al. 2019

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

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“…According to their definition, an impartial selection rule should have as low approximation ratio as possible. This line of research was concluded by the work of Fischer and Klimm [10] who proposed impartial mechanisms with the optimal approximation ratio of 2.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…In distributed multi-agent systems, leader election (e.g., see [2]) can be thought of as a selection problem of similar flavor. Other notable examples include the selection of a representative in a group [10], funding decisions based on peer reviewing [10] or even finding the most popular user of a social network [1].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impartial Selection with Additive Approximation Guarantees

Caragiannis

Christodoulou

Protopapas

2019

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Impartial selection has recently received much attention within the multi-agent systems community. The task is, given a directed graph representing nominations to the members of a community by other members, to select the member with the highest number of nominations. This seemingly trivial goal becomes challenging when there is an additional impartiality constraint, requiring that no single member can influence her chance of being selected. Recent progress has identified impartial selection rules with optimal approximation ratios. Moreover, it was noted that worstcase instances are graphs with few vertices. Motivated by this fact, we propose the study of additive approximation, the difference between the highest number of nominations and the number of nominations of the selected member, as an alternative measure of the quality of impartial selection.Our positive results include two randomized impartial selection mechanisms which have additive approximation guarantees of Θ( √ n) and Θ(n 2/3 ln 1/3 n) for the two most studied models in the literature, where n denotes the community size. We complement our positive results by providing negative results for various cases. First, we provide a characterization for the interesting class of strong sample mechanisms, which allows us to obtain lower bounds of n − 2, and of Ω( √ n) for their deterministic and randomized variants respectively. Finally, we present a general lower bound of 2 for all deterministic impartial mechanisms.

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“…It is extremely unnatural and relies on the fact that every vertex bar one abstains from voting. Indeed, Fisher and Klimm [4] showed that without abstentions the permutation mechanism is at least 7 12 -optimal. They leave open the possibility that the permutation mechanism actually proffers a better approximation guarantee than 7 12 .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This impartial selection problem was introduced independently by Holzman and Moulin [5] and Alon et al [1]. Fisher and Klimm [4] showed that the permutation mechanism is impartial and 1 2 -optimal, that is, it selects an agent who gains, in expectation, at least half the number of votes of most popular agent. Furthermore, they showed the mechanism is 7 12 -optimal if agents cannot abstain in the election.…”

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confidence: 99%

A Near-Optimal Mechanism for Impartial Selection

Bousquet

Norin

Vetta

2014

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. We examine strategy-proof elections to select a winner amongst a set of agents, each of whom cares only about winning. This impartial selection problem was introduced independently by Holzman and Moulin [5] and Alon et al. [1]. Fisher and Klimm [4] showed that the permutation mechanism is impartial and 1 2 -optimal, that is, it selects an agent who gains, in expectation, at least half the number of votes of most popular agent. Furthermore, they showed the mechanism is 7 12-optimal if agents cannot abstain in the election. We show that a better guarantee is possible, provided the most popular agent receives at least a large enough, but constant, number of votes. Specifically, we prove that, for any ǫ > 0, there is a constant Nǫ (independent of the number n of voters) such that, if the maximum number of votes of the most popular agent is at least Nǫ then the permutation mechanism is ( 3 4 − ǫ)-optimal. This result is tight. Furthermore, in our main result, we prove that near-optimal impartial mechanisms exist. In particular, there is an impartial mechanism that is (1 − ǫ)-optimal, for any ǫ > 0, provided that the maximum number of votes of the most popular agent is at least a constant Mǫ.

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Optimal impartial selection

Cited by 30 publications

References 20 publications

On Strategyproof Conference Peer Review

On Strategyproof Conference Peer Review

Impartial Selection with Additive Approximation Guarantees

A Near-Optimal Mechanism for Impartial Selection

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