Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities

Lescop, Denis

doi:10.1007/s10058-006-0018-8

Cited by 15 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…The early literature on provision of public goods under asymmetric information (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet mechanisms, Green and Laffont 1979) and more recently Makowski and Mezzetti (1994), Ledyard and Palfrey (1994) and Lescop (2007) among others "would permit confiscatory action [. .…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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NIMBY and mechanism design under different constitutional constraints

Besfamille

Lozachmeur

2009

Int Tax Public Finance

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our paper adopts the mechanism-design approach, as Rob (1989), Klibanoff and Morduch (1995), Waehrer (2003) and Lescop (2007). Rob (1989) finds the optimal mechanism that enables a polluting firm to elicit the private information of its nearby residents, information about their cost of suffering pollution.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

NIMBY and mechanism design under different constitutional constraints

Besfamille

Lozachmeur

2009

Int Tax Public Finance

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“…For strong Nash implementation under singledipped preferences see Yamamura (2016). There is also a literature on this topic when side payments are allowed, e.g., Lescop (2007) or Sakai (2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains

Peters

Roy

Sadhukhan

et al. 2017

Journal of Mathematical Economics

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“…Economists have spent considerable effort understanding the causes of Nimby phenomena. Several contributions have probed the role of, respectively, property rights (Kunreuther and Kleindorfer 1986), compensating mechanisms (Easterling and Kunreuther 1996;Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997;Lescop 2007;Minehart and Neeman 2002;Mitchell and Carson 1986;O'Sullivan 1993), and the political process (Feinerman, Finkelshtain, and Kan 2004). These factors are certainly relevant, but there is a further one, so far disregarded in the literature, that may be relevant too, as the two stories just seen suggest: the institutional nature of the service operator, in particular with regard to citizen participation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Customer Ownership and Quality Provision in Public Services Under Asymmetric Information

2016

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The implementation of projects producing external effects is often a source of disagreement and conflict between hosting and nonhosting communities. The article focuses on the impact of participatory ownership on conflict resolution and social welfare in the presence of asymmetric information and imperfect quality monitoring. We show that in such situations the participatory solution may help solve deadlocks that money transfers to a for-profit operator cannot solve. The analysis highlights three main factors behind this fact. First, a customer-owned cooperative internalizes, at least partially, the external effects generated by the project. Second, the alignment of cooperative members' preferences with those of the social planner reduces (in some cases eliminates) the distortions caused by information asymmetries. Third, cooperatives require less costly monitoring than their for-profit counterparts. We also show that cooperatives' productive inefficiency with respect to for-profits may emerge endogenously as a consequence of a lower pressure to compete on costs for the market.(JEL H23, L33, P13)

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Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities

Abstract: Club good, Externalities, Auctions, Bayesian equilibrium, C72, D44, D82, H41,

Cited by 15 publications

References 12 publications

NIMBY and mechanism design under different constitutional constraints

NIMBY and mechanism design under different constitutional constraints

An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains

Customer Ownership and Quality Provision in Public Services Under Asymmetric Information

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