1976
DOI: 10.1287/moor.1.4.390
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Optimal Plans for Dynamic Programming Problems

Abstract: It is proved that there exist stationary optimal plans for discounted dynamic programming problems, and that there exist semi-Markov ϵ-optimal plans for positive dynamic programming problems. The actions are required to be taken in a variable action set F(s), and the reward function r(s, a) is a Borel measurable function of (s, a) and an u.s.c. function of a. Our results are related to recent work by Furukawa, Maitra, and Schal. The key tool is a generalization of a selection theorem of Dubins and Savage.

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

1
49
0

Year Published

1994
1994
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
5
1
1

Relationship

0
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 96 publications
(50 citation statements)
references
References 12 publications
1
49
0
Order By: Relevance
“…We assume that B is a Borel subset of S × Y whose projection on the horizontal axis is S. From Theorem 3 in [22], we obtain the following auxiliary result.…”
Section: Auxiliary Results and The Proofmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…We assume that B is a Borel subset of S × Y whose projection on the horizontal axis is S. From Theorem 3 in [22], we obtain the following auxiliary result.…”
Section: Auxiliary Results and The Proofmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…and f * λ (s) belongs to the convex hull of N w * (s) for every s ∈ S. Using standard results on discounted dynamic programming [5], [22], we infer that…”
Section: Lemma 8 the Mapping V → M V Is Convex Compact-valued And Uppmentioning
confidence: 92%
“…We shall refer to any direct mechanism (i(¢); f(¢)) satisfying the incentive compatibility constraints (8) as well as the individual rationality constraints (9) as a competitively viable direct mechanism (or as a CVD mechanism). Note that because each contract set K i (for i = 0; 1; : : : ; m) contains a "no contracting" choice, endogenous participation by …rms and the agent is automatically built into the notion of competitive viability.…”
Section: Competitively Viable Direct Mechanismsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…8 Under a competitively viable direct contracting mechanism the agent will participate in the mechanism and choose the …rm-contract pair intended by the mechanism precisely because, by design, the mechanism provides no incentives 6 In general, the agent's best response mapping is upper semicontinuous in catalog pro…les (rather than continuous), and each …rm's payo¤ function is upper semicontinuous in contracts (rather than continuous). The connection between nonexistence of Nash equilibria and lack of continuity in competitive contracting games was …rst illustrated via an example by Myerson (1982).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation