Optimal privacy and authentication on a portable communications system

Abstract

Beller, Chang and Yacobi [2] have recently proposed a set of secret key and public key protocols to meet authentication and privacy requirements for conversation set-up protocols for the initiating party of portable communication systems. This paper improves upon the protocols to obtain a higher assurance of authentication and key distribution. Conversation set-up protocols for the responding party are discussed, a public key protocol providing end-to-end authentication and privacy is described, and relative as well as collective merits of the protocols are emphasised.

Static validation of security protocols

“…As pointed out by Carlsen [23] this is not achieved by the protocol because the attacker may masquerade as a base station. This attack turns up as the pairs (A i , • ) and ( • , B j ) in ψ in Table 11.…”

“…The Improved MSR (IMSR) protocol [8], on the other hand, is meant to provide mutual authentication by including an extra certificate for the base station B in the first message ({|B|} K − U ). Once the certificate has been sent in clear it may, however, be replayed as reported by Carlsen [23]. As a consequence all the attacks on MSR still work on the IMSR and this includes our new parallel session attack where unintended use of the new certificate shows up as pairs (B j , A i ) in ψ.…”

A New Authentication Protocol for Portable Communication Systems

“…BeHer et al, [2,3], proposed several authentication protocols based on Modular Square Root (MSR) and/or EIGamal signature scheme. Carlsen, [6], proposed some enhancements to the protocols in [2]. Xu and Wang , [19], improved the protocol in [3].…”

Fast automatic security protocol generation

“…The Carlsen also describes a five message protocol, the Secret Key Initiator Protocol [9], as follows:…”