2012
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2023819
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Optimal Size of Hedge Funds: Conflict between Investors and Fund Managers

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Cited by 8 publications
(33 citation statements)
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“…Perold and Salomon Jr () also explain that there is an optimal size for investors: if a fund is too small, the fixed costs of running the fund are too high, and if a fund is too large, the liquidity issues and capacity constraints will reduce its performance. This is also confirmed by the findings of Yin (). He reports a positive relationship between fund managers' compensation and fund asset growth, and finds that managers allow fund size to grow beyond optimal size for performance to achieve a much larger fund size that maximizes their compensation.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 87%
“…Perold and Salomon Jr () also explain that there is an optimal size for investors: if a fund is too small, the fixed costs of running the fund are too high, and if a fund is too large, the liquidity issues and capacity constraints will reduce its performance. This is also confirmed by the findings of Yin (). He reports a positive relationship between fund managers' compensation and fund asset growth, and finds that managers allow fund size to grow beyond optimal size for performance to achieve a much larger fund size that maximizes their compensation.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 87%
“…A modest co-investment could pay off handsomely for managers if it causes AUM to grow significantly larger than without co-investment, regardless of hedge fund performance, indicating that the cost of a co-investment signal can be low for poor quality managers to imitate. As a result, high management fees become a big profit centre (Yin 2016) which distorts fund manager incentives. Fee-based incentive misalignment in the hedge fund industry is well documented; for example "zombie funds", such as the infamous collapse of Amaranth whose manager Brian Hunter lost $7 billion for Amaranth, but still collected more than $100 million in compensation after its demise.…”
Section: How Do Managerial Stakes In Their Funds Come About?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A modest co-investment could pay off handsomely for managers if it causes AUM to grow significantly larger than without coinvestment, regardless of hedge fund performance, indicating that the cost of a co-investment signal can be low for poor quality managers to imitate. As a result, high management fees become a big profit centre (Yin 2016) which distorts fund manager incentives.…”
Section: Self-selection Of Management Participation and Fund Survivormentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There is an expanding body of literature on the two first factors, i.e., the effects of some fund and fund management characteristics (see, for a recent example Yin, 2016). We consider both the age (AGE) and size (SIZE) of the funds to be relevant characteristics for analysis.…”
Section: Determinants Of Mutual Fund Performancementioning
confidence: 99%