Optimal Stopping and Utility in a Simple Modelof Unemployment Insurance

Abstract

Managing unemployment is one of the key issues in social policies. Unemployment insurance schemes are designed to cushion the financial and morale blow of loss of job but also to encourage the unemployed to seek new jobs more pro-actively due to the continuous reduction of benefit payments. In the present paper, a simple model of unemployment insurance is proposed with a focus on optimality of the individual's entry to the scheme. The corresponding optimal stopping problem is solved, and its similarity and differences with the perpetual American call option are discussed. Beyond a purely financial point of view, we argue that in the actuarial context the optimal decisions should take into account other possible preferences through a suitable utility function. Some examples in this direction are worked out.

Discretionary Extensions to Unemployment Insurance Compensation and Some Potential Costs for a McCall Worker

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Church and Politics: An Assessment of the Bases and Approach of the Church’s Political Engagement in Ghana

“…Anquandah asserts that, in all its efforts to achieve its vision, the CCG is "guided by the Holy Bible and in all matters of national interest, remained non-partisan." 156 This according to Gyampo has been instrumental in the CCG's political and public influence. He asserts "Its leaders have not been interested in pursuing frontal and active partisan politics… they have refused to be coopted by incumbent governments."…”