OPTIMAL TWO‐PART TARIFF LICENSING CONTRACTS WITH DIFFERENTIATED GOODS AND ENDOGENOUS R&amp;D*

Faulí‐Oller, Ramon; González, Xulia; Sandonı́s, Joel

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9957.2012.02311.x

Cited by 14 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Faulí‐Oller et al . () show that the innovation is licensed to all firms in an oligopolistic industry considering the combination of a per‐unit royalty and a fixed fee mechanism.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Two‐part Tariff Licensing Mechanisms

Martín

Saracho

2014

The Manchester School

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This paper studies the optimal two‐part tariff licensing contract for an internal patentee in a differentiated Cournot duopoly. We find that the type of the royalty payment, whether ad valorem or per‐unit, that it is optimal for the patentee depends on the kind of goods produced in the industry, more precisely on whether they are substitutes or complements and on the degree of product differentiation. We also find that licensing always increases social welfare, although it may hurt consumers.

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“…Faulí‐Oller et al . () show that the innovation is licensed to all firms in an oligopolistic industry considering the combination of a per‐unit royalty and a fixed fee mechanism.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Two‐part Tariff Licensing Mechanisms

Martín

Saracho

2014

The Manchester School

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“…The analysis of licensing a cost‐reducing invention to a differentiated goods industry of a general size has been addressed by Faulí‐Oller et al (). Referring to Faulí‐Oller et al (), consider an industry with three goods, each produced by one firm. The inverse demand function of good

i

is given by

p_{i} = α - q_{i} - β \sum_{j \neq i} q_{j}

, where

i, j = 1, 2, 3

.…”

Section: Extensionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As an extension, Poddar and Sinha () discussed the two‐part tariff licensing. Fixed‐fee licensing and two‐part tariff licensing in a Cournot oligopoly were considered in Faulí‐Oller, González, and Sandonís () and Marjit, Kabiraj, and Mukherjee (), respectively. Licensing in a Bertrand duopoly was analyzed in Erkal () and Wang and Yang ().…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Price and quantity competition in an asymmetric duopoly with licensing

Niu

2018

J Public Economic Theory

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By introducing licensing, this study reconsiders the relative dominance of price‐ and quantity‐setting strategies in an asymmetric duopoly. It shows that if the initial cost difference is small or the goods are close substitutes, then both firms will prefer the quantity strategy. Conversely, for the other cases, heterogeneous‐strategy equilibrium will appear, under which the low‐cost firm will choose a price strategy and the high‐cost firm will choose a quantity strategy. With an endogenous mode of market competition, licensing has always proven to be welfare‐improving.

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“…Finally, if we consider linear contracts, with or without an alternative supply, it can be shown (see for example Sandonís (2012)), that the wholesale prices are independent of the number of downstream …rms so, in that context, downstream mergers would be anticompetitive also.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Welfare Effects of Downstream Mergers and Upstream Market Concentration

Faulí‐Oller

Sandonı́s

2016

Singapore Econ. Rev.

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We consider a dominant upstream …rm selling an input to several downstream …rms through observable, non-discriminatory two-part tari¤ contracts. Downstream …rms can alternatively buy the input from a less e¢cient source of supply. In this setting we analyze the relationship between the competitive e¤ects of downstream mergers and the level of concentration at the upstream level. We show that a downstream merger leads to lower wholesale prices. This translates into lower …nal prices only when the upstream market is su¢ciently concentrated. In this case, a downstream merger tends to be both procompetitive and pro…table.

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OPTIMAL TWO‐PART TARIFF LICENSING CONTRACTS WITH DIFFERENTIATED GOODS AND ENDOGENOUS R&D*

Cited by 14 publications

References 16 publications

Optimal Two‐part Tariff Licensing Mechanisms

Optimal Two‐part Tariff Licensing Mechanisms

Price and quantity competition in an asymmetric duopoly with licensing

Welfare Effects of Downstream Mergers and Upstream Market Concentration

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