Orbitofrontal Cortex Uses Distinct Codes for Different Choice Attributes in Decisions Motivated by Curiosity

Blanchard, Tommy C.; Hayden, Benjamin Y.; Bromberg-Martin, Ethan S.

doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2014.12.050

Cited by 295 publications

(333 citation statements)

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“…One possibility is that experienced options benefit from an information bonus: subjects choose them because they offer both a reward and potentially useful information about reward outcomes and probabilities (Blanchard, Hayden, & Bromberg-Martin, 2015;Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009;Niv & Chan, 2011). Although the long training period we used meant that the information that could be gleaned from the experienced option was greatly reduced in our study, monkeys may still value information in stable environments after thousands of trials of experience (Blanchard et al, 2015;Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although the long training period we used meant that the information that could be gleaned from the experienced option was greatly reduced in our study, monkeys may still value information in stable environments after thousands of trials of experience (Blanchard et al, 2015;Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009). This residual, perhaps even instinctive, uncertainty about an experienced option's outcomes may motivate risky choices (Hayden, Heilbronner, Nair, & Platt, 2008;Heilbronner & Hayden, 2013).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The description-experience gap in risky choice in nonhuman primates

Heilbronner

Hayden

2015

Psychon Bull Rev

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Risk attitudes in humans depend on the format used to present the gamble: we are more risk-averse for common gambles in the gains domain whose properties are described to us verbally than for those whose properties we learned about solely through experience. This difference, which constitutes part of the description-experience gap, is important, because it highlights the role of knowledge acquisition in decision-making. The reasons for the gap remain obscure, but could depend upon uniquely human cognitive abilities, such as those associated with language. Thus, the gap may or may not extend to nonhuman animals. For this study, rhesus monkeys performed a novel task in which the properties of some gambles were explicitly cued (described), whereas others were learned through previous choices (experienced). Our monkeys displayed a description-experience gap. Overall, monkeys were more risk-seeking for experienced than for described gambles. This difference was observed for a range of gamble probabilities (from 20% to 80% likelihood of payoff), indicating that it is not limited to low probability events. These results suggest that the descriptionexperience gap does not depend on uniquely human cognitive abilities, such as those associated with language, and support the idea that epistemic influences on risk attitudes are evolutionarily ancient.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The description-experience gap in risky choice in nonhuman primates

Heilbronner

Hayden

2015

Psychon Bull Rev

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“…Recent studies begin to shed light on this question by showing that animals (including pigeons, monkeys, and humans) prefer to observe cues that are predictive rather than nonpredictive about a future reward, and that the value of informative cues is encoded in the orbital frontal cortex and midbrain dopamine (DA) cells (4,5). These investigations, however, have been limited to noninstrumental contexts in which animals seek to obtain information about a reward merely in order to know, but cannot act based on the information.…”

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confidence: 99%

Parietal neurons encode expected gains in instrumental information

Foley

Kelly

Mhatre

et al. 2017

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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In natural behavior, animals have access to multiple sources of information, but only a few of these sources are relevant for learning and actions. Beyond choosing an appropriate action, making good decisions entails the ability to choose the relevant information, but fundamental questions remain about the brain's information sampling policies. Recent studies described the neural correlates of seeking information about a reward, but it remains unknown whether, and how, neurons encode choices of instrumental information, in contexts in which the information guides subsequent actions. Here we show that parietal cortical neurons involved in oculomotor decisions encode, before an information sampling saccade, the reduction in uncertainty that the saccade is expected to bring for a subsequent action. These responses were distinct from the neurons' visual and saccadic modulations and from signals of expected reward or reward prediction errors. Therefore, even in an instrumental context when information and reward gains are closely correlated, individual cells encode decision variables that are based on informational factors and can guide the active sampling of action-relevant cues.information sampling | saccades | attention | decisions | reward I n natural behavior, animals have access to multiple sources of information, but few of these sources are relevant for learning or action. Making good decisions therefore entails not only the selection of the ultimate action but, more primarily, the decision of which source of information to sample. Decisions about information sampling are central for tasks as diverse as making a medical diagnosis (which is the best test to prescribe?), making categorization decisions (which is the most informative feature?) (1, 2), and guiding skilled actions (what should I keep my eyes on while driving?). Despite the ubiquity and significance of active sampling mechanisms, few studies have been devoted to understanding these mechanisms and their importance for decision theories. Evidence accumulation has been extensively examined in decision research (3) but has been portrayed as a passive process, in the sense that decision makers rely on predetermined (experimenter selected) sources of information but cannot themselves determine which source to consult to guide a future action.Recent studies begin to shed light on this question by showing that animals (including pigeons, monkeys, and humans) prefer to observe cues that are predictive rather than nonpredictive about a future reward, and that the value of informative cues is encoded in the orbital frontal cortex and midbrain dopamine (DA) cells (4, 5). These investigations, however, have been limited to noninstrumental contexts in which animals seek to obtain information about a reward merely in order to know, but cannot act based on the information. Very little is known about the much more common scenario in which animals sample instrumental information to make decisions and guide future actions (6).Understanding instrumental sampling poses...

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“…Once again, a strong preference for the suboptimal alternative was found. Monkeys, too, show a similar effect when they prefer discriminative stimuli over nondiscriminative stimuli even when the discriminative stimuli predict less reinforcement on average than the nondiscriminative stimuli (Blanchard, Hayden, & Bromberg-Martin, 2015). …”

Section: Volume 11 2016mentioning

confidence: 96%

When Humans and Other Animals Behave Irrationally

Zentall¹

2016

CCBR

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The field of comparative cognition has been largely concerned with the degree to which animals have analogs of the cognitive capacities of humans (e.g., imitation, categorization), but recently attention has been directed to behavior that is judged to be biased or suboptimal. We and some of our colleagues have studied several of these and have found that pigeons too show similar paradoxical behaviors. In the present review I will discuss three of these behaviors: sunk cost, justification of effort, and unskilled gambling. Sunk cost is the tendency to decide to spend more on a losing project because of the amount already invested. Pigeons show similar effects even when there is no ambiguity about the results of continuing versus changing alternatives. Justification of effort is the added value one often gives to a reward based on the effort exerted to obtain it. Pigeons too prefer stimuli that signal outcomes that they have had to work harder to obtain. Humans engage in unskilled gambling, like lotteries and slot machines, in which the return is typically less than the investment. And pigeons show a similar tendency to choose a low-probability, high-payoff alternative (gamble) over a more optimal, high-probability, low-payoff alternative. The fact that animals such as pigeons show behavior thought to be unique to humans suggests that the basis for such behaviors is not likely to result from culture or social mechanisms and may have basic behavioral origins.

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Orbitofrontal Cortex Uses Distinct Codes for Different Choice Attributes in Decisions Motivated by Curiosity

Cited by 295 publications

References 43 publications

The description-experience gap in risky choice in nonhuman primates

The description-experience gap in risky choice in nonhuman primates

Parietal neurons encode expected gains in instrumental information

When Humans and Other Animals Behave Irrationally

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