Recent theories suggest that reward-based choice reflects competition between value signals in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). We tested this idea by recording vmPFC neurons while macaques performed a gambling task with asynchronous offer presentation. We found that neuronal activity shows four patterns consistent with selection via mutual inhibition. (1) Correlated tuning for probability and reward size, suggesting that vmPFC carries an integrated value signal, (2) anti-correlated tuning curves for the two options, suggesting mutual inhibition, (3) neurons rapidly come to signal the value of the chosen offer, suggesting the circuit serves to produce a choice, (4) after regressing out the effects of option values, firing rates still could predict choice – a choice probability signal. In addition, neurons signaled gamble outcomes, suggesting that vmPFC contributes to both monitoring and choice processes. These data suggest a possible mechanism for reward-based choice and endorse the centrality of vmPFC in that process.

SUMMARY Decision-makers are curious and consequently value advance information about future events. We made use of this fact to test competing theories of value representation in Area 13 of orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). In a new task, we found that monkeys reliably sacrificed primary reward (water) to view advance information about gamble outcomes. While monkeys integrated information value with primary reward value to make their decisions, OFC neurons had no systematic tendency to integrate these variables, instead encoding them in orthogonal manners. These results suggest that the predominant role of the OFC is to encode variables relevant for learning, attention, and decision-making rather than integrating them into a single scale of value. They also suggest that OFC may be placed at a relatively early stage in the hierarchy of information-seeking decisions, before evaluation is complete. Thus, our results delineate a circuit for information-seeking decisions and suggest a neural basis for curiosity.

Intertemporal choice tasks, which pit smaller/sooner rewards against larger/later ones, are frequently used to study time preferences and, by extension, impulsivity and self-control. When used in animals, many trials are strung together in sequence and an adjusting buffer is added after the smaller/sooner option to hold the total duration of each trial constant. Choices of the smaller/sooner option are not reward maximizing and so are taken to indicate that the animal is discounting future rewards. However, if animals fail to correctly factor in the duration of the postreward buffers, putative discounting behavior may instead reflect constrained reward maximization. Here, we report three results consistent with this discounting-free hypothesis. We find that (i) monkeys are insensitive to the association between the duration of postreward delays and their choices; (ii) they are sensitive to the length of postreward delays, although they greatly underestimate them; and (iii) increasing the salience of the postreward delay biases monkeys toward the larger/later option, reducing measured discounting rates. These results are incompatible with standard discounting-based accounts but are compatible with an alternative heuristic model. Our data suggest that measured intertemporal preferences in animals may not reflect impulsivity, or even mental discounting of future options, and that standard human and animal intertemporal choice tasks measure unrelated mental processes.delay discounting | animal models | patience | foraging | rhesus macaque A nimal decision makers in natural environments regularly face choices between smaller rewards delivered sooner and larger rewards delivered later. To study how animals make this tradeoff, psychologists often measure preferences in intertemporal choice tasks, which directly pit smaller/sooner (SS) rewards against larger/later (LL) ones (1). Animals will typically sacrifice some of the long-term rate-maximizing benefits offered by the LL option to choose SS options. These present-biased preferences are sometimes thought to reflect impulsivity and poor self-control (2-4) and are often taken as a model for human impulsivity (2-6).In nearly all animal intertemporal choice studies, many trials are strung together in sequence. When faced with a choice between an SS and an LL option, rate-maximizing behavior may sometimes dictate choosing the SS option to begin the next trial more quickly and thus increase the overall rate of reward (7). To avoid this confound, animal psychologists normally add an adjusting buffer after the SS reward to equalize trial lengths. As a result, total time for either option is matched, and the ratemaximizing strategy is to always choose the LL option. However, this buffering strategy serves its purpose only if animals correctly incorporate postreward delays into their decisions and if they correctly associate specific postreward delays with the choices that produced them. If animals fail to do either of these things, then their preferences cannot be interpreted...

The dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) is a key hub of the brain's executive control system. Although a great deal is known about its role in outcome monitoring and behavioral adjustment, whether and how it contributes to the decision process remain unclear. Some theories suggest that dACC neurons track decision variables (e.g., option values) that feed into choice processes and is thus "predecisional." Other theories suggest that dACC activity patterns differ qualitatively depending on the choice that is made and is thus "postdecisional." To compare these hypotheses, we examined responses of 124 dACC neurons in a simple foraging task in which monkeys accepted or rejected offers of delayed rewards. In this task, options that vary in benefit (reward size) and cost (delay) appear for 1 s; accepting the option provides the cued reward after the cued delay. To get at dACC neurons' contributions to decisions, we focused on responses around the time of choice, several seconds before the reward and the end of the trial. We found that dACC neurons signal the foregone value of the rejected option, a postdecisional variable. Neurons also signal the profitability (that is, the relative value) of the offer, but even these signals are qualitatively different on accept and reject decisions, meaning that they are also postdecisional. These results suggest that dACC can be placed late in the decision process and also support models that give it a regulatory role in decision, rather than serving as a site of comparison.

When we evaluate an option, how is the neural representation of its value linked to information that identifies it, such as its position in space? We hypothesized that value information and identity cues are not bound together at a particular point but are represented together at the single unit level throughout the entirety of the choice process. We examined neuronal responses in two-option gambling tasks with lateralized and asynchronous presentation of offers in five reward regions: orbitofrontal cortex (OFC, area 13), ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC, area 14), ventral striatum (VS), dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), and subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC, area 25). Neuronal responses in all areas are sensitive to the positions of both offers and of choices. This selectivity is strongest in reward-sensitive neurons, indicating that it is not a property of a specialized subpopulation of cells. We did not find consistent contralateral or any other organization to these responses, indicating that they may be difficult to detect with aggregate measures like neuroimaging or studies of lesion effects. These results suggest that value coding is wed to factors that identify the object throughout the reward system and suggest a possible solution to the binding problem raised by abstract value encoding schemes.