Orchestration along the Pareto frontier

Mattli, Walter; Seddon, Jack; Abbott, Kenneth W.; Genschel, Philipp; Snidal, Duncan; Zangl, Bernhard

doi:10.1017/cbo9781139979696.017

Cited by 26 publications

(13 citation statements)

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“…Delegating governance tasks to intermediaries is an important facet of governmental CSR policies. Governmental CSR policies that involve intermediaries do resonate with extant research on orchestration (see, e.g., Mattli & Seddon, 2015) and regulatory intermediaries (see, e.g. De Silva, 2017) in many ways.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 97%

State Governance Beyond the ‘Shadow of Hierarchy’: A social mechanisms perspective on governmental CSR policies

Schneider

2019

Organization Studies

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The extent to which state authorities can regulate the externalities and the behaviour of multinational corporations (MNCs) is limited. This is especially true when MNCs operate in or do business with fragile states that lack the willingness and/or resources to effectively and legitimately regulate businesses. However, MNCs often engage in private regulation to remedy some of the problems that unregulated business behaviour creates. In this article we examine what limits the effectiveness and legitimacy of the contributions made by MNCs to global governance. We explore the mechanisms that state authorities in functioning states can use to overcome these barriers as well as the boundary conditions of these mechanisms at both company and government levels. We provide a framework for governmental CSR policies and describe the ways in which functioning states engage in governance beyond the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ and directly or indirectly influence business conduct beyond the territory in which their legal regulations can be enforced.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 97%

State Governance Beyond the ‘Shadow of Hierarchy’: A social mechanisms perspective on governmental CSR policies

Schneider

2019

Organization Studies

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“…The availability of intermediaries has important effects on the CC trade‐off. A large supply of qualified potential intermediaries facilitates governor control (Mattli & Seddon ). Ex ante, a large pool may include more intermediaries with both competence and aligned goals.…”

Section: Trading Competence For Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competence versus control: The governor's dilemma

Abbott

Genschel

Snidal

et al. 2019

Regulation & Governance

103

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Most governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. Principal-agent theory views indirect governance primarily as a problem of information: the agent has an informational advantage over the principal, which it can exploit to evade principal control. But indirect governance creates a more fundamental problem of power. Competent intermediaries with needed expertise, credibility, legitimacy, and/or operational capacity are inherently difficult to control because the policy benefits they can create (or the trouble they can cause) give them leverage. Conversely, tight governor control constrains intermediaries. The governor thus faces a dilemma: emphasizing control limits intermediary competence and risks policy failure; emphasizing intermediary competence risks control failure. This "governor's dilemma" helps to explain puzzling features of indirect governance: why it is not limited to principal-agent delegation but takes multiple forms; why governors choose forms that appear counterproductive in an informational perspective; and why arrangements are frequently unstable.

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“…Mattli and Seddon 2015. performance because they reduce the capacity of state principals to monitor and control IO agents. Mattli and Seddon 2015. performance because they reduce the capacity of state principals to monitor and control IO agents.…”

Section: Sources Of De Facto Policy Autonomymentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond Institutional Design: Explaining the Performance of International Organizations

Lall¹

2017

Int Org

117

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International organizations (IOs) have long been a central focus of scholarship in international relations, yet we know remarkably little about their performance. This article offers an explanation for differences in the performance of IOs and tests it using the first quantitative data set on the topic. I argue that the primary obstacle to effective institutional performance is not deviant behavior by IO officials-as conventional "rogue-agency" analyses suggest-but the propensity of states to use IOs to promote narrow national interests rather than broader organizational objectives. IOs that enjoy policy autonomy vis-à-vis states will thus exhibit higher levels of performance. However, in the international context policy autonomy cannot be guaranteed by institutional design. Instead, it is a function of (1) the existence of (certain types of) institutionalized alliances between IOs and actors above and below the state; and (2) the technical complexity of IO activities. I provide empirical evidence for the argument by constructing and analyzing a cross-sectional data set on IO performance-based in part on a new wave of official government evaluations of IOs and in part on an original survey of IO staff-and conducting a comparative case study in the realm of global food security.

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Orchestration along the Pareto frontier

Cited by 26 publications

References 0 publications

State Governance Beyond the ‘Shadow of Hierarchy’: A social mechanisms perspective on governmental CSR policies

State Governance Beyond the ‘Shadow of Hierarchy’: A social mechanisms perspective on governmental CSR policies

Competence versus control: The governor's dilemma

Beyond Institutional Design: Explaining the Performance of International Organizations

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