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States and international organizations have found irresistible cause in a globalizing world to coopt nonstate actors (NGOs, private standard setters and so forth) to manage the manifold problems arising under their stretched mandates and resources. The pooling of capacities in the pursuit of common goals seems perfectly sensible. Yet although the strategy of cooptation has become a policy of choice, policy makers often lack full knowledge of its implications. As Philip Selznick first showed, cooptation can have unintended consequences, shifting leadership from one organization to another. We place this fertile insight in a better specified analytical framework. That is, one capable of explaining when and how leadership shifts occur and where the status quo leaders will remain at the helm. Using original interview data and structured focused comparisons to test the framework, we reveal dramatic variation in leadership changes following the cooptation of outside actors in global financial and environmental governance.

This chapter applies competence–control theory to capital market governance. For much of the twentieth century, centralized market intermediaries such as the New York Stock Exchange and London Metal Exchange served as efficient platforms for capital formation and risk management. However, this pattern of good self-regulatory governance was displaced by socially unproductive rent-seeking and widespread distortions following the introduction of increased competition between fragmented exchange platforms and external statutory controls. The governor’s dilemma provides an elegant framework for explaining this deterioration in the quality of capital market governance, which confounds standard expectations about the salutary effects of competition and the presumed vices of self-regulation. Unpacking the changing modalities of governor control (cooptation versus delegation) and the impact of differences in market structure (centralization versus fragmentation), this chapter shows that good market governance was supported by soft control mechanisms and a radical attenuation of the competence–control tradeoff in centralized markets. This efficient equilibrium unraveled as growing goal divergence—induced by market fragmentation—encouraged harder governor controls that inadvertently eroded the competence of market intermediaries.

Involutional eyelid malposition directly correlates with axial globe length with the ectropion group having lengthier eyes compared with the entropion group. Hence, axial globe length could be an influential factor in the onset of involutional eyelid malposition.