Order-Fairness for Byzantine Consensus

Kelkar, Mahimna; Zhang, Fan; Goldfeder, Steven; Juels, Ari

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-56877-1_16

Cited by 108 publications

(111 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Another line of research that could potentially prevent transaction fees from spiking considers order-fairness consensus protocols [14,15]. The idea is to ensure that transactions are ordered in the blockchain in the same order they arrived in.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sliding Window Challenge Process for Congestion Detection

Ayelet¹,

Azouvi²,

McCorry³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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Many prominent smart contract applications such as payment channels, auctions, and voting systems often involve a mechanism in which some party must respond to a challenge or appeal some action within a fixed time limit. This pattern of challenge-response mechanisms poses great risks if, during periods of high transaction volume, the network becomes congested. In this case, fee market competition can prevent the inclusion of the response in blocks, causing great harm. As a result, responders are allowed long periods to submit their response and overpay in fees. To overcome these problems and improve challenge-response protocols, we suggest a secure mechanism that detects congestion in blocks and adjusts the deadline of the response accordingly. The responder is thus guaranteed a deadline extension should congestion arise. We lay theoretical foundations for congestion signals in blockchains and then proceed to analyze and discuss possible attacks on the mechanism and evaluate its robustness. Our results show that in Ethereum, using short response deadlines as low as 3 hours, the protocol has > 99% defense rate from attacks even by miners with up to 33% of the computational power. Using shorter deadlines such as one hour is also possible with a similar defense rate for attackers with up to 27% of the power.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sliding Window Challenge Process for Congestion Detection

Ayelet¹,

Azouvi²,

McCorry³

et al. 2022

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…These work were, however, mostly of theoretical nature in that they did not contain empirical evidence of deviation by miners, but rather assumed that miners might deviate. Prior efforts also proposed consensus algorithms to guarantee fair-transaction selection [5,35,38]. Kelkar et al [35] proposed a consensus property called transaction order-fairness and a new class of consensus protocols called Aequitas to establish fair-transaction ordering in addition to also providing consistency and liveness.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Prior efforts also proposed consensus algorithms to guarantee fair-transaction selection [5,35,38]. Kelkar et al [35] proposed a consensus property called transaction order-fairness and a new class of consensus protocols called Aequitas to establish fair-transaction ordering in addition to also providing consistency and liveness. A number of prior work focused on enabling miners to select transactions.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Selfish & opaque transaction ordering in the Bitcoin blockchain

Messias

Alzayat

Chandrasekaran

et al. 2021

Proceedings of the 21st ACM Internet Measurement Conference

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Most public blockchain protocols, including the popular Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchains, do not formally specify the order in which miners should select transactions from the pool of pending (or uncommitted) transactions for inclusion in the blockchain. Over the years, informal conventions or "norms" for transaction ordering have, however, emerged via the use of shared software by miners, e.g., the GetBlockTemplate (GBT) mining protocol in Bitcoin Core. Today, a widely held view is that Bitcoin miners prioritize transactions based on their offered "transaction fee-per-byte. " Bitcoin users are, consequently, encouraged to increase the fees to accelerate the commitment of their transactions, particularly during periods of congestion. In this paper, we audit the Bitcoin blockchain and present statistically significant evidence of mining pools deviating from the norms to accelerate the commitment of transactions for which they have (i) a selfish or vested interest, or (ii) received dark-fee payments via opaque (non-public) side-channels. As blockchains are increasingly being used as a record-keeping substrate for a variety of decentralized (financial technology) systems, our findings call for an urgent discussion on defining neutrality norms that miners must adhere to when ordering transactions in the chains. Finally, we make our data sets and scripts publicly available. CCS CONCEPTS• Security and privacy → Social aspects of security and privacy; Economics of security and privacy.

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“…The amplified need in scalable geo-replicated Byzantine faulttolerant reliability systems has motivated an enormous amount of study on the Byzantine State Machine Replication (SMR) problem [17,31]. Many variants of the problem were defined in recent years [28,32,43] to capture the needs of blockchain systems. To address the fairness issues that naturally arise in interorganizational deployments, we focus on the classic long-lived Byzantine Atomic Broadcast (BAB) problem [12,19], which in addition to total order and progress also guarantees that all proposals by correct processes are eventually included.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

All You Need is DAG

Keidar

Kokoris-Kogias

Naor

et al. 2021

Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing

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We present DAG-Rider, the first asynchronous Byzantine Atomic Broadcast protocol that achieves optimal resilience, optimal amortized communication complexity, and optimal time complexity. DAG-Rider is post-quantum safe and ensures that all values proposed by correct processes eventually get delivered. We construct DAG-Rider in two layers: In the first layer, processes reliably broadcast their proposals and build a structured Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) of the communication among them. In the second layer, processes locally observe their DAGs and totally order all proposals with no extra communication. CCS CONCEPTS• Theory of computation → Distributed algorithms; • Security and privacy → Distributed systems security.

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Order-Fairness for Byzantine Consensus

Cited by 108 publications

References 29 publications

Sliding Window Challenge Process for Congestion Detection

Sliding Window Challenge Process for Congestion Detection

Selfish & opaque transaction ordering in the Bitcoin blockchain

All You Need is DAG

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