Ordering Peace: Thailand's 2016 Constitutional Referendum

McCargo, Duncan; Alexander, Saowanee T.; Desatova, Petra

doi:10.1355/cs39-1b

Cited by 22 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…With the promulgation of a new constitution in 2017, the military government took the initial step in the direction of returning power to civilians. As with the 2007 Constitution, the new constitution is a transparent effort to redesign institutions to diminish the scale of a victory by Thaksin-linked parties (McCargo, Alexander, and Desatova 2017, 68). The 2017 Constitution put in place a mixed member apportionment system with 350 single-member districts and 150 party-list seats.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

De-Thaksinizing Thailand: The Limits of Institutional Design

Caraway

2020

J. East Asian Stud.

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Almost two decades after the initial victory of Thai Rak Thai, scholars still debate the forces behind Thaksin's rise to power. I revisit these debates and argue for a more explicit analysis of dynamics over time. I distinguish analytically between the founding moment of TRT's first victory and the subsequent reproduction of its dominance. I argue that TRT's financial muscle was a sufficient condition for its 2001 victory, that institutions merely contributed to the scale of its victory, and that its platform was not decisive. Once in power, however, institutions were instrumental in allowing TRT to complete its term, but more important for its long-term dominance was the rapid implementation of its campaign promises, which created a mass constituency that in turn made Thaksin-linked parties resilient at the polls despite institutional reforms designed to weaken their electoral performance.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

De-Thaksinizing Thailand: The Limits of Institutional Design

Caraway

2020

J. East Asian Stud.

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“…This, of course, is the demand for greater political inclusion that has been central to the pro-Thaksin or “Red” equivalential chain since 2001. Though the majority of the populace approved a new constitution in a 2016 referendum, many analysts have questioned its democratic credentials (McCargo et al, 2017: 68). The same criticism has also been directed at the new constitution itself.…”

Section: Populism In Thailandmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The same criticism has also been directed at the new constitution itself. Undoubtedly, with its provisions of an appointed Senate, the possibility of an appointed PM, and the requirement of governments to follow the military’s 20 year reform plan, the military will maintain significant reserve power (McCargo et al, 2017: 68). While Thailand may no longer be suffering from the ills of populism, its return to authoritarianism has marked a second phase of its “populist hangover”.…”

Section: Populism In Thailandmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although it could be argued that the elite was able to defeat the pro-Thaksin forces for the first time in the constitution referendum of 2016, the fact remains that 22 out of 77 provinces, mostly pro-Thaksin strongholds of the North and Northeast, rejected its adoption (McCargo et al, 2017: 80). This also provides reason to believe that the Thai elite has not yet been able to reincorporate or repackage the demands of the various social groups that linked together in a chain of equivalence to insist upon their equal inclusion in Thai social and political life.…”

Section: Analysis and Conclusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Populist hangover: Lessons from Southeast Asia

Matijasevich

2018

Asian Journal of Comparative Politics

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This article explores the concept of “populist hangover” in the context of Southeast Asia. Its intention is to provide analysts of populism with a series of lessons derived from the Southeast Asian experience. “Populist hangover” is the notion that, though democrats bemoan the arrival of the populist due to the use of popular support to dismantle effective democratic institutions, the departure of the populist does not return the polity to its previous institutional standard. The primary reason for this is the fact that populism’s emergence is both a cause and symptom of social/political exclusion. As a result, the departure of the populist prior to the resolution of this exclusion creates social/political circumstances not conducive to a “return to normal”, democratic or otherwise. The article uses two “populist hangover” cases to support its theoretical argument – the “short hangover” of the Thai military’s political re-emergence and the “long hangover” of the continued hegemonic authoritarian rule of the People’s Action Party in Singapore.

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“…What is more, modern authoritarian leaders from Rwanda to Russia use referendums to claim public support, ensuring results through the repression of political campaigning, media intimidation, or the co-optation of nominally independent electoral authorities (Reyntjens 2004;Irisova 2020). Thailand's 2016 constitutional referendum, for instance, was a mere façade that effectively banned public debate and completely lacked independent oversight (McCargo et al 2017). It failed to convincingly legitimize the new junta-drafted charter and instead fermented public discontent.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Direct democracy integrity and the 2017 constitutional referendum in Turkey: a new research instrument

Kersting

Grömping

2021

Eur Polit Sci

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In some countries, direct democracy is used successfully to increase legitimacy of decisions or mitigate conflict, and in other countries, authoritarian leaders seem to instrumentalize and manipulate referendums. How can referendum integrity be analyzed? This article presents an empirical instrument to evaluate the variety and integrity of referendums. This encompasses criteria for the analysis of direct democracy. First, we develop a referendum cycle model based on the electoral cycle framework, assessing referendum quality in a number of dimensions from electoral laws and electoral procedures, thematic limitations of referendums, to voter registration, the initiation of referendums, campaign and media coverage as well as campaign financing. The empirical instrument is designed to be used in expert surveys, and piloted in the Turkish constitutional referendum of 2017. The article presents the results of the pilot study, draws out opportunities and limitations of this approach and suggests avenues for its future development.

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Ordering Peace: Thailand's 2016 Constitutional Referendum

Cited by 22 publications

References 4 publications

De-Thaksinizing Thailand: The Limits of Institutional Design

De-Thaksinizing Thailand: The Limits of Institutional Design

Populist hangover: Lessons from Southeast Asia

Direct democracy integrity and the 2017 constitutional referendum in Turkey: a new research instrument

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