How do social banks signal their social commitment to motivated funders? This paper hypothesizes that two main channels are used, namely selectivity and transparency. We test these predictions using a rich dataset comprising balancesheet information on 5,000 European banks over the 1998-2013 period. The results suggest that social screening leads social banks to higher project selectivity compared with mainstream banks. Social banks also tend to be more transparent than other banks. However, combining selectivity and transparency can result in excess liquidity. Overall, the empirical findings not only confirm our theoretical hypotheses, but also raise challenging issues on the management of social banks.
AbstractHow do social banks signal their social commitment to motivated funders? This paper hypothesizes that two main channels are used, namely selectivity and transparency. We test these predictions using a rich dataset comprising balance-sheet information on 5,000European banks over the 1998-2013 period. The results suggest that social screening leads social banks to higher project selectivity compared with mainstream banks. Social banks also tend to be more transparent than other banks. However, combining selectivity and transparency can result in excess liquidity. Overall, the empirical findings not only confirm our theoretical hypotheses, but also raise challenging issues on the management of social banks.